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Abstract 
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) concept aimed to clarify the relationship 
between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, and its invocation during the 
recent intervention in Libya provides an opportunity to assess its impact. This project 
compares the events of Libya with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the early 1990s, 
examining the framing of these conflicts as well as the perceived role of other states, the 
engagement of international organizations with the concept, and the effect on operations 
during the humanitarian interventions themselves. Providing a historical comparison 
more accurately situates the contributions of RtoP in the re-prioritization of human rights 
over states sovereignty, while also providing a chance to highlight recurring concerns 
with the emerging doctrine.   
  
   4 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s armed intervention in 
Libya in 2011, journalist David Rieff sounded the death knell for the United Nations’ 
new intervention doctrine, the Responsibility to Protect that had justified the coalition’s 
endeavor. He wrote that the doctrine was a threat to the international system’s legitimacy 
as it claimed a moral high ground while perpetuating the geopolitical status quo—the 
Global North intervening upon the Global South.1 The Libya case, Rieff insists, 
exemplifies the worst of the well-intended business of humanitarian intervention. My 
project arises out of a similar concern. Interested in whether a change in framing could 
truly result in improved practices, I sought to evaluate the Responsibility to Protect’s 
impact. In the coming chapters, I assess the success of the newly adopted Responsibility 
to Protect (RtoP), by comparing the reaction to impending atrocity in Libya with an 
intervention that took place before RtoP had been implemented: the case of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the early 1990s. By comparing these two cases, I hope to discover the 
impact of RtoP by assessing differences in the framing of these cases, the responses from 
important actors, and operational decisions. If RtoP has been absorbed as a norm, one 
would expect to see vast differences between the two cases. If, however, the 
Responsibility to Protect is nothing but a change in the vocabulary used to justify military 
action, this superficiality should also become clear through such a comparison. RtoP as a 
concept has undergone intense scrutiny as well as effusive praise. A subject involving 
multiple sectors—IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, militaries—RtoP’s impact could 
be enormous. In engaging with this topic, I will shed some light what, if any, effect RtoP 
                                                
1 David Rieff, “R2P, R.I.P,” New York Times, 7 Nov. 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 23 Mar. 2013). 
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has had on the humanitarian intervention paradigm, and whether it adequately responds 
to the problems of past humanitarian interventions.   
In this paper, I will examine the extent to which the Responsibility to Protect has 
prompted any changes in the international community’s response to large-scale human 
rights abuses and crises. While some scholars (such as Aidan Hehir) argue that RtoP is 
merely a rhetorical ploy without substantive reforms, others argue that it is a radical 
reconceptualization of state sovereignty that challenges the right to self-determination 
(Daniel Warner). I take a nuanced perspective by arguing that RtoP represents a 
significant shift in the way in which actors talk about atrocity and understand their role in 
mitigating it, as it is less concerned with states and their sovereignty and more interested 
in the preservation of lives. Nevertheless, the implementation of RtoP results in new 
questions about the power of the Security Council and Global North states.  
I have chosen to structure this paper as a comparative study of Bosnia in the 
1990s and Libya in 2011. I selected these states because of their historical significance 
and because each prompted intense debate over the jurisdiction of the international 
community in human rights crises. Bosnia’s war is partly a product of Europe’s de-
construction after the fall of the Soviet Union. As such, actors—namely the United 
Nations, NATO, and individual states—were unsure of how to react. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the splintering of the former Yugoslavia and the ensuing tension between 
ethnic and religious groups prompted a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian 
Muslims. The UN response was that of a traditional peacekeeping operation—a 
monitoring force unable to act except in self-defense. While states expressed concern 
about the methods used against the Bosnian Muslims, their sentiment clashed with a 
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reluctance to violate Bosnia-Herzegovina’s right to manage its own affairs. In Libya, on 
the other hand, Libyan civilians requested support from NATO and the UN for their 
popular uprising. Much of the consternation over sovereignty, so prevalent twenty years 
earlier in Bosnia, seemingly vanished.  
Libya is notable as the first case of armed intervention after the adoption of RtoP, 
Much of the debate surrounding international involvement in Libya centers on the 
concept’s applicability; thus this case has implications for future humanitarian 
interventions. It must be acknowledge that the two cases are not identical. The Bosnian 
case is entirely more complex, even in terms of the sheer number of actors, while Libya’s 
war was prompted by a people sick of their dictator’s harsh reign. They represent, 
however, humanitarian intervention before and after the emergence of RtoP, which is the 
locus of my paper. The small number of cases from which to choose limits this study. It 
is difficult to make a claim on RtoP’s influence with only two examples, and the use of 
RtoP in Libya does not guarantee its future invocation. What remains constant between 
these two cases, and any future conflicts, is competing national interests that dictate 
action. A state will never engage in entirely altruistic behavior. What RtoP did, in the 
case of Libya, is make it permissible to intervene for the purpose of human protection; it 
did not make such an intervention obligatory.  
My comparison of these cases comprises three main areas for each case study. 
Language and the representation of the conflict by world leaders demonstrate the kinds of 
considerations being made by states before their involvement in the conflict. American 
and French perspectives are important in both cases because of their military capabilities 
and for their interest in humanitarian affairs. While not the only states involved, they 
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represent the majority of my analysis. In comparing comments from the Clinton 
administration with those of the Obama administration, one notes a new vocabulary full 
of terms like “responsibility,” which highlight the increased urgency of action. Similarly, 
historical influence shines through in these comparisons, with, for example, the 
intervention in Bosnia being severely impacted by the painful memories of American 
losses in Somalia. France, likewise, suffuses much of its language and framing with 
references to the Holocaust—an event deeply embedded in their national memory. 
Speeches and statements provide an insight into the national interest in humanitarian 
intervention; while language can sometimes just be language without any substance, its 
use in these situations can be indicative of a greater understanding of a state’s political 
role. A leader as powerful as the president of the United States has undeniable influence 
in shaping his or her citizens’ worldviews as well as the perceptions of other powerful 
states, and their language choices should not be discounted. By examining language and 
framing from the United States and France, I will demonstrate that an evolution has 
occurred in terms of the growing importance of the individual’s human rights over the 
state sovereignty in the discussion of mass atrocity. 
The Development of the Responsibility to Protect  
After the catastrophes of the 1990s, Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan put 
forth a question to the General Assembly: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept 
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of our common humanity?”2  As a response to this question, the Canadian government 
formed the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to 
devise a response strategy for the international community. The ICISS, a committee of 
academics, policy makers, heads of international organizations representing both 
industrial and developing states, rejects the right to intervene in favor of the responsibility 
to protect, because that view “implies evaluating the issues from the point of view of 
those needing support, rather than those who may be considering intervention.”3 The 
report issued by the ICISS, entitled The Responsibility to Protect, attempted to respond to 
many of the critiques of humanitarian interventions past.  
The Responsibility to Protect advances the idea that sovereign states have a 
responsibility to ensure the protection of their own citizens from crises like large-scale 
human rights abuses and humanitarian crises. It breaks with tradition by making the 
state’s access to sovereignty a condition of whether it upheld its role of being responsible 
for the protection of its own people. Neglecting to protect its citizens negates a state’s 
sovereignty, according to this text. The ICISS also insists upon an additional 
responsibility belonging to the broader community of states. When a single state cannot 
or will not protect its citizens, the international community must take on the 
responsibility.4 It emphasizes that the international responsibility to protect holds greater 
importance than the principle of non-intervention.5 The Responsibility to Protect features 
three components: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the 
                                                
2 Kofi A. Annan, “‘We The Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,” (New York: 
United Nations Department of Public Information: 2000), http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm 
(accessed 12 Nov. 2012).  
3 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to Protect," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002), 
2.  
4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001), viii.  
5 Ibid.  
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responsibility to rebuild. Remedying gaps between framing and political will, addressing 
root causes of conflict (like poverty), and the use of sanctions are all proposed as part of 
prevention. It establishes guidelines for interventions of both the military and non-
military variety, adhering closely to Just War principles.6 Post-intervention involvement 
should help build a durable peace through the promotion of good governance and 
development. 
RtoP represents a significant turning point in the evolution of humanitarian 
intervention, a practice that has itself undergone major transformations in the post-Cold 
War period. An expansion in United Nations Security Council power in the early 1990s 
coincided with increased humanitarian intervention and a transition away from traditional 
peacekeeping. Because of this period of flux, voices within the United Nations, academia, 
and the political sphere weighed in to create a new conception of the appropriate response 
to mass atrocity. The current understanding of humanitarian intervention, as encapsulated 
within the Responsibility to Protect, has provoked controversy and debate for its alternate 
understanding of sovereignty—RtoP places human security before state sovereignty. This 
position, already beginning to develop in the post-Cold War period, was codified with 
RtoP.  
International organizations, namely the UN and NATO negotiate many of the 
terms of humanitarian interventions and, in the case of the UN, determine the legality of 
any armed humanitarian intervention. Complementing an analysis of language and 
                                                
6 Dating from the time of St. Augustine, many scholars have contributed to the development of Just War 
theory, including Grotius, St. Thomas Aquinas, and contemporarily, Michael Walzer. Jus ad bellum rules 
require that a war that is justified will have six characteristics: Just cause, right intention, proper authority 
and public declaration, be the last resort, probability of success, and proportionality. “Jus ad bellum,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 28 Jul. 2005, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2 (accessed 14 
Dec. 2012).  
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framing, I will look at key United Nations resolutions in order to demonstrate the 
inclusion of RtoP vocabulary, and thus its role in legitimizing humanitarian campaigns. 
Institutional support links directly with rhetorical shifts, as these bodies have the power to 
implement ideas and make use of the doctrine’s vocabulary. Institutional choices in 
vocabulary surrounding the topic of humanitarian intervention, especially RtoP, 
determine public perceptions and influence policy. New offices and departments focused 
on the concept of civilian protection and RtoP indicate that institutions are taking the 
concept seriously and seeking to adopt it structurally. Such indications of institutional 
support bode well for the development of RtoP as a doctrine of international relations. By 
comparing these two interventions, I will measure the advancements arising out of the 
critiques of the Bosnia war to demonstrate that RtoP has not yet revolutionized the 
response to humanitarian crises though it has changed the conversation in a critical way. 
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Background Information  
 
Having laid out much of this paper’s agenda and having already introduced some 
of the vocabulary and tensions that are in play, the rest of this introduction serves to 
expand with more necessary vocabulary and provide a more detailed picture of the 
debates surrounding the subject of RtoP and humanitarian intervention. The historical 
conflict between sovereignty and human rights orients much of the discussion 
surrounding the reactions to mass atrocity. Over the past two decades, those two themes 
have seen a re-prioritization with human rights largely reigning supreme in the eyes of 
the international community.   
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum defines mass atrocity as the 
aggregate term for a variety of violent and murderous crimes that contradict human 
rights.7 While mass atrocity has no legal definition as of yet, the term typically refers to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing, the first three of 
which are legally defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.8 
Responses to these types of crime have varied but can include diplomatic measures, 
economic sanctions and penalties, military operations or the threat of military force, legal 
measures, or no action at all. Humanitarian interventions have been multilateral and 
                                                
7 Scott Strauss, “Identifying Genocide and Related Forms of Mass Atrocity,” United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/pdf/indentifying-genocide.pdf (accessed 
3 Jan. 2013).  
8 Part 2, Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 12 Jul. 1999, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (accessed 20 Jan. 2013); Ethnic cleansing is defined as 
the “deliberate, organized, and usually violent expulsion of people from an area on the basis of their 
perceived ethnic, communal, sectarian, or religious identity.” “Ethnic Cleansing,” Glossary of Terms for 
Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace, 
http://glossary.usip.org/resource/ethnic-cleansing (accessed 12 Nov. 2012).  
The United Nations Commission of Experts in 1993 in 1993 defined “Ethnic cleansing” as “rendering an 
area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the 
area.” From: Roger Cohen, “Ethnic Cleansing,” Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-
guide/ethnic-cleansing/ (accessed 31 Mar. 2013). 
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unilateral, approved by the United Nations, forbidden by the United Nations, or tacitly 
accepted by the United Nations.   
Humanitarian intervention occurs as a response to mass atrocity. Though these 
terms are bandied about with some frequency, the definitions of mass atrocity and 
humanitarian intervention, respectively, can be somewhat unclear. Humanitarian 
intervention, as defined by Bhikhu Parekh, is an “intervention inspired by humanitarian 
considerations.”9 Semantically speaking, the term contains conflicting connotations: “if 
we say intervention, then not humanitarian but military and forced; and if we say 
humanitarian, then not intervention but aid.”10 Intervention, in this paper, refers to 
military operations undertaken to stop human rights violations. Rieff points to 
humanitarian intervention’s definitional imprecision as the practice’s largest flaw. 
Because it so immensely powerful (allowing outside powers to intervene in other states’ 
internal affairs) and so entirely separate from realist calculations (“What matters, from 
the perspective of the State or group of States contemplating a humanitarian intervention, 
is the effect a conflict has on civilians”11), human intervention is difficult to understand 
and to formalize. The concept of intervention for the purpose of humanitarian relief, in 
existence before RtoP, contradicts some central tenets of international relations. This 
model of humanitarian action stands in direct opposition to the idea of inviolable state 
sovereignty. For that reason, humanitarian intervention risks being perceived as an 
intervention with an agenda of political control.  
                                                
9 Bhikhu Parekh, "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention," International Political Science Review 18, no. 1 
(1997), 53. 
10 Jerzy Zajadlo, “Legality and the Legitimization of Humanitarian Intervention,” American Behavioral 
Scientist 48, no. 6 (2005), 658.   
11 David Rieff, “Humanitarian Intervention,” http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/humanitarian-
intervention/ (accessed 18 Jan. 2013).  
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United Nations Framework  
 
Because much of the action surrounding humanitarian affairs and RtoP in 
particular takes place within the United Nations, I will spend a few paragraphs 
highlighting that body’s relevant guiding principles—namely, the tradition of 
noninterference and the support of human rights standards. Established in Article 2 of the 
UN Charter, the idea of noninterference holds that “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” and that “[nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter.”12 The traditional conception of state sovereignty, 
then, is central to then the founding spirit of the UN: states have the right to autonomy 
within their own borders. Though this tradition of internal autonomy has a long history, it 
is not inviolable. Also present in the Charter is the ability of the UN to “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”13 Interstate 
war is only legal when states act in self-defense, collective self-defense, and when 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter14 In addition to the previously stated principle of noninterference, 
                                                
12 United Nations, “Article 1,” Charter of the United Nations, 26 Jun. 1945, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, (accessed 2 May 2012).  
13 Ibid.  
14 J.S. Morton, "The Legality of NATO's Intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999: Implications for the 
Progressive Development of International Law," ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 9, no. 
1 (2002), 4. 
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the UN also has the task of acting to ensure peace by whatever means they deem 
necessary. As the violation of human rights and humanitarian crises is not explicitly 
mentioned within those articles, the task of justifying such a military action requires a 
more inclusive and nuanced definition of international peace and security.  
While the UN has one tradition of supporting autonomy for individual states, it 
has another equally valid tradition of upholding human rights. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, arising out of the horrors of World War Two and adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1948, conflicts with the perceived right of states to do whatever 
they please by acknowledging the right of all human beings for freedom from persecution 
and violence. Member states, by signing the Declaration, “have pledged themselves to 
achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”15 The Declaration is 
contained within the International Bill of Human Rights, along with the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, documents “by which State parties accepted a legal as well as a 
moral obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.”16 
Additional protections favoring human rights include the Genocide Convention of 1948 
and the Geneva Conventions, which further the consolidation of human rights norms.17 
                                                
15 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1949). 
16 United Nations, “Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights,” (Geneva, 1996).  
17 United Nations, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” (New York, 
1948). The Genocide Convention “does not establish a specific monitoring body or expert committee. It 
stipulates that any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such 
action under the United Nations Charter, which they consider appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of acts of genocide,” entry into force Jan 12, 1951;  
United Nations, “Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,” (Geneva, 
1949).  
The fourth Geneva Convention, passed in August 1949, establishes the protection of civilians in times of 
war. Civilians should have access to medical care and basic necessities and should not be the target of any 
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These two competing ideals—one of autonomous states, one of a world respectful of 
human rights—form the central tension of RtoP.18  
After the end of the Cold War, international politics changed dramatically, 
redefining the roles of individual states and of the United Nations as a collective. 
Suddenly the UN Security Council, being unhampered by an incessant rivalry, had more 
freedom to act. The desire to avert genocides and large-scale violence against civilians 
and the commitment to human rights created a tension with the UN’s principle of 
noninterference. Intervention provokes controversy, with debates arising around the 
justifications for intervening, the thresholds needed to determine a humanitarian crisis, 
the effect of intervening on traditions of state sovereignty, and the role of the United 
Nations and its Security Council.  
The question of reconciling state sovereignty with the need to react in some way 
to devastating persecution found an answer in the work of Francis Deng. Deng, formerly 
the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs), developed a concept of sovereignty as responsibility in considering the 
plight of IDPs in Africa. He claims that in order “[t] o be legitimate, sovereignty must 
demonstrate responsibility, which means at the very least ensuring a certain level of 
protection for and providing the basic needs of the people.”19 Instead of the state’s 
inviolable right to independence and noninterference, Deng argues that states are often 
                                                                                                                                            
wartime activities.   “When persons protected by the present Convention do not benefit or cease to benefit, 
no matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization provided for in the 
first paragraph above, the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an organization, to 
undertake the functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the 
Parties to a conflict. ”  
18 A tension that admittedly does not arise until much later. With decolonization comes a greater focus on 
sovereignty, and then the Cold War era reinforces Western support for independent, democratic states. 
19 Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 28.  
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the reason for conflicts in the area of human rights and humanitarianism, saying that 
while “the state, the centerpiece of the international system, is often capable or willing to 
provide adequate solutions or remedies . . . the government often acts as a barrier. It 
prevents the international community from providing protection and assistance to the 
needy and helping in the search for an end to destructive violence.”20 States can be the 
problem by not working for the good of their people in an effort to cling to their 
independence.  In such cases, Deng says, a state has a choice to either “discharge its 
responsibilities or otherwise risk forfeiting its sovereignty.”21  Deng draws from common 
law guiding African values, which finds that “the individual is ultimately the core of the 
social order . . . The protection of every individual member is as important to the group as 
the group solidarity is a source of security for the individual.”22 As one of the first writers 
to hint at a new definition of state sovereignty, Deng’s work is often held up as the 
inspiration for RtoP. By accepting a doctrine of conditional sovereignty—in which states 
can maintain their autonomy so long as they fulfill their role in protecting their 
populations—as proposed with the Responsibility to Protect, some states fear the forfeit 
of their right to act independently and without the direct interference by other states.  
Where RtoP has been less effective in changing the intervention paradigm is in 
the actual application of its reactive capacity. In order to provide a comparison between 
the pre- and post-RtoP paradigms, I intend to make use of the reaction to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina of the mid-1990s and the 2011 campaign in Libya as my two case 
studies. In Bosnia, humanitarian intervention fails resoundingly with the massacre in 
Srebrenica. Because of a widespread reluctance to enter into the fray after the Black 
                                                
20 Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, 1.  
21 Ibid., 28. 
22 Ibid., 7. 
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Hawk disaster in Somalia, the UN did not throw its whole weight behind the effort to 
counter genocide and the presence of peacekeepers did not deter widespread violence. 
The faulty response to this humanitarian crisis caused the UN and the main powers within 
that structure to begin to realize the shortcomings of their approach. It was from Bosnia 
that the debate on state sovereignty versus the protection of human rights began to take 
hold. Libya, an operation with the purpose of protecting the civilian population from their 
government’s threats of mass violence, marks the most expansive application of RtoP 
since its inception.  As this operation took place following reform efforts within the 
United Nations, it provides a glimpse of the new interventionist model. Comparing these 
two interventions, in Bosnia and in Libya, on the rhetorical, institutional, and operational 
levels, yields a revealing analysis of RtoP’s efficacy in shifting the reaction to atrocity.   
The next chapter will consist of a review of the literature. I will trace the 
emergence of RtoP by discussing early conceptions of humanitarian intervention. While 
that concept did not emerge until after the end of the Cold War, discussions of just war, 
humanitarian aid, and human rights provide a point of departure for understanding 
humanitarian intervention. Throughout the 1990s, cases like Rwanda and Kosovo 
challenged the status quo and prompted further reforms in the sphere of armed 
interventions. Chronologically organized, the literature review highlights the recurring 
debates and questions prompted by humanitarian intervention.  
 The third chapter, the case study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will establish the post-
Cold War, pre-RtoP humanitarian intervention paradigm. It contains a brief history of the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and its ensuing nationalist tensions. Analyses of the 
language and framing, responses from key players, and operational decisions, give a 
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sense of the international community’s hesitancy to act during the years of conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia due to a preoccupation with the preservation of noninterference.      
Next, Chapter 4 contains a case study of Libya as a parallel example of a post-
RtoP intervention. It follows the same structure as the previous chapter, with a look at the 
language and framing, responses from the main states involved and the main international 
organizations, and the operational decisions. Throughout this chapter, I will draw 
comparisons with Bosnia in order to demonstrate the impact of the RtoP in the response 
to atrocity. The heightened language of emergency used to frame this crisis along with 
the more decisive and immediate action taken indicate a decision-making process 
altogether different from that of the early 1990s.  
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
 
The debates surrounding RtoP and humanitarian intervention boil down to an 
uncertainty over the effects of violating state sovereignty in order to protect human rights. 
Without understanding the impact on autonomy and without being able to force states to 
engage in humanitarian interventions, the international community reaches an impasse. 
The case studies in this paper, that of Bosnia in the early 1990s and Libya in 2011, reflect 
the changing international landscape of the post-Cold War. The United Nations was no 
longer crippled by the rivalry between the two superpowers and therefore had new 
opportunities for action (just how to use that freedom was less certain). In this chapter, I 
will first discuss some early precursors to the contemporary humanitarian intervention. 
Though humanitarian intervention did not exist during the Cold War, political scientists 
have long debated the meaning of just wars and the role of outside states. Once we reach 
the 1990s, the concept of humanitarian intervention is tested and proves wanting in 
multiple cases. An important trigger for the re-framing of humanitarian intervention as 
seen in RtoP was the non-intervention in Rwanda. Non-interventions or interventions that 
came too late prompt a reconsideration of the role of traditional peacekeeping and the 
role of the United Nations. Literature from this time period indicates several structural 
critiques as well as the perpetual problem of lack of motivation, or political will, to 
respond. 
These critiques become vastly important during the development of the 
Responsibility to Protect. The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty sought to address the failings evident in the interventions of the 1990s. 
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RtoP’s literature draws upon debates surrounding humanitarian intervention, but it also 
brings up a new question: is RtoP more effective as a long-term prevention strategy, or as 
a rallying cry for a coalition intervention?  An inconsistent understanding of RtoP 
contributes to controversy overs its invocation, particularly in Libya.  
Early Understandings of Intervention  
The perceived duties and responsibilities of states in cases of atrocities outside 
their own borders have been expressed in several iterations, and here we will look at 
some relevant philosophies that emerged after World War II and began the debate 
between state sovereignty and human security. Michael Walzer, in his 1977 book Just 
and Unjust Wars, articulated a view that states do have a right to intervene when faced 
with mass atrocity. He holds that states have the right to try to halt any slaughter despite 
the fact that the “legalist paradigm indeed rules out such efforts, but that only suggests 
that the paradigm, unrevised, cannot account for the moral realities of military 
intervention.”23 Traditional conceptions of sovereignty, according to Walzer, are outdated 
and flawed. In his text, Walzer rejects the Millsian concept that people get the 
government they deserve24 and that assistance is an unworthy exercise. He puts forth a 
few cases in which interventions can be legitimate and useful: after a secessionist 
movement has begun and is shown to be representative, to balance previous interventions 
by other major powers, and to guard against massacres. In these instances, “we permit or, 
after the fact, we praise or don’t condemn these violations of the formal rules of 
sovereignty, because they uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of 
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which sovereignty itself is merely an expression.”25 This concept, aligning with the droit 
d’ingérence (the right to interfere), holds that states should not expect free license to 
enact their will within their borders. Without internal liberty, a state’s right to sovereignty 
within its borders is void. Assaults on human rights can be met with an active response 
by the other states, and the international legal framework must reflect that reality.  
The “right of interference” is one of the more controversial interpretations of the 
contract between states. René Cassin, an author of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, insisted upon that member states of the United Nations had a “right to intervene 
and a duty to act” when confronted with violations of human rights that threaten 
international security.26 Cassin’s assertion that the international community could and 
should involve themselves in another state’s domestic affairs indicates an early awareness 
of the preeminence of human rights over sovereignty.  
Interference is a term with negative connotations in both in English and French, 
but, as Bernard Kouchner asserts, “nothing is more consensual insofar as intervention is 
always a response to a cry for help.”27 Such a perspective assumes sound intelligence and 
good judgment on the part of the interveners and says little of the “host” country or its 
inhabitants.  This model of the right to interfere fails to consider the perspectives of the 
group on the receiving end of the intervention. Gareth Evans calls it “inherently one-
sided, not in any way acknowledging the anxieties of those in the global South who had 
all too often been the beneficiaries of missions civilisatrices in the past.”28 Critiques of 
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re-colonization easily emerge if other states have the right to interfere without the input 
of that area’s population on the mission’s mandate, length of stay, and methods. For 
developing countries and those not represented on the Security Council, the prospect of 
humanitarian interventions is reminiscent of colonial periods past. With the philosophy of 
the “right to interfere,” it is hard to say whether an intervention occurs for humanitarian 
protection or for a state’s economic or power-hungry interests.  
Post-Cold War Humanitarian Intervention 
 With the fall of the Berlin Wall came new power for international bodies like the 
UN. While during the Cold War the UN had been hampered by bipolarity and the veto 
power of the Security Council member states, it now had greater capacity to act 
decisively.29 The Cold War period had been married to the concept of nonintervention, 
with the General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of 
American States all condemning armed intervention as akin to aggressive, coercive 
behavior.30 Human rights law and international humanitarian law, though in existence 
and codified within international governing bodies, did not yet take precedence over the 
all-important guarantee of state sovereignty. 
A new emphasis on multilateralism pervaded the humanitarian interventions of 
the 1990s. The UNSC, “intoxicated by the cooperative euphoria of the Gorbachev era,”31 
became more actively engaged against threats to international peace and security. Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, in a report to the Secretary-General of the UN, found that structural 
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changes and the new prevalence of democracy lessened the importance of sovereignty.32 
He notes that since 1988, the United Nations established fourteen new operations and that 
within the first six months of 1992, the number of UN soldiers and police officers 
quadrupled.33 Boutros-Ghali writes of the need to expand peacekeeping to include the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as the necessity of accelerating the timeline of 
deployment. He proposes that the UN’s role in maintaining collective security could also 
be expanded to include the enforcement of ceasefires, allowing UN troops to use force 
“to ensure respect for the ceasefire.”34 More critically, Boutros-Ghali expresses an 
expanded understanding of sovereignty: “While respect for the fundamental sovereignty 
and integrity of the state remains central, it is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine 
of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute 
as it was conceived to be in theory.”35 Instead of placing all importance on 
noninterference, Boutros-Ghali suggests that the rights of the individual deserve the same 
respect that had been granted to states.36 Moving beyond the struggle between democracy 
and communism, the underlying intervention philosophy centered on the alleviation of 
human pain and the encouragement of more stable governments.  
Walzer took up the question of intervention again in 1995, contradicting the 
feasibility of Boutros-Ghali’s proposed intervention philosophy. Instead, he argues that 
intervention is at its core a negative action—that it has the goal of mitigating violence, 
not of spreading industrialization or democracy.37 Its basic goal is to remove whatever 
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tyrant is oppressing his people and then vacate the territory. He argues that in a case like 
Bosnia, where there are many actors and few clear “good guys,” that model of 
humanitarian intervention loses its strength. When the problem is internal and the actors 
are not all states, leaving quickly after deposing one leader could do more to upset 
security than taking no action at all. For Walzer, the concept of an all-encompassing 
intervention that brings a regime into the realm of a western democracy misses the point 
entirely. The aim, he writes, is “not to alter power relations on the ground, but only to 
ameliorate their consequences—to bring food and medical supplies to populations 
besieged and bombarded, for example, without interfering with the siege or 
bombardment.”38  
The framing of intervention as “humanitarian,” too, seemed problematic to some 
academics. By calling armed intervention “humanitarian” from the onset, “it did not take 
into account the need for either prior preventive action or subsequent follow-up 
assistance . . . it tended to trump sovereignty with intervention at the outset of the debate 
by implicitly de-legitimizing dissent as anti-humanitarian.”39 If the humanitarian thing to 
do is invade a country, then calling for civil society solutions or further diplomacy would 
seemingly fall into the anti-humanitarian category—a shortsighted conclusion. The issues 
surrounding this framing of the response to mass atrocity, not only the terminology but 
also its operationalization, is a powerful catalyst for RtoP’s genesis. From the 
unwillingness to engage with the genocide in Rwanda to the violation of safe areas in 
Bosnia, this response to atrocity demonstrated how a little bit of action can prevent larger 
                                                
38 Walzer, "The Politics of Rescue," 53. 
39 Michael Newman. Humanitarian intervention: confronting the contradictions (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 189. 
   25 
scale solutions.40 Humanitarian intervention is more likely to evoke an image of inaction 
and or, at least, ineffectual action than to be considered a helpful model. 
Several events stick out in history as crucial junctures in the birth of a new 
version of intervention—Somalia discourages the United States from engaging in further 
interventions, and Rwanda and Bosnia serve as markers of the transition between an 
expanded peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. The manmade famine in war-
torn, anarchic Somalia, resulted in the death of 250,000 people by the end of 199241 and 
prompted the US to engage in peace operations–airlifting food in and providing logistical 
support to the Pakistani security troops in Mogadishu under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter.42 The US military pursued a solely humanitarian objective initially but began to 
target warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in June 1993. In October 1993, a battle in 
Mogadishu resulted in the death of 18 US soldiers.43 Public support for this mission in a 
far-off country deteriorated, and US involvement ceased.44Although a complex story that 
cannot be done justice with a few lines in a paper, the international community’s lack of 
involvement in the conflict in Rwanda led to a genocide in 1994 during which at least 
500,000 Rwandans died.45 The slaughter was meticulously planned and carried out 
despite the in-country presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNAMIR). The 
following extract from Howard Adelman is referenced in the African Union’s report on 
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the genocide, entitled “The Preventable Genocide”: “This was the most easily 
preventable genocide one can imagine. There was advance notice. The UN was in 
military control of the key center--the airport. International law had already sanctioned 
intervention in the case of genocide and, in any case, the UN had already been given a 
mandate to protect civilians in Rwanda.”46 All evidence pointed to the need for outside 
involvement to stem the killing. World leaders received eyewitness reports from multiple 
sources, including UNAMIR Force Commander Romeo Dallaire, detailing the slaughter, 
knew it to be more than just tribal warfare, but still reduced their presence.47 An 
intervening force of 5,000, according to Dallaire and as well as other US Army leaders, 
could have mitigated the genocide. Because some states were unwilling to call the 
situation in Rwanda “genocide,” action was not deemed necessary.48 Dallaire attributes 
the unwillingness of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to act a result of “that 
paranoia of Somalia coming back.”49 States preferred not to put their troops at risk unless 
absolutely necessary, and so Dallaire was forced to stick to the “classic Chapter VI 
mandate . . . the rules of engagement were to be strictly self defense, and nothing 
more.”50 His troops were there, according to the United Nations, to keep the peace and 
not to implement it. By insisting on adherence to an old strategy of peacekeeping—
observance and little more—the international community allowed the massacre of 
                                                
46 Adelman, “Rwanda revisited: in search for lessons,” 432.  
47 African Union, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Jul. 2002, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d1da8752.html (accessed 23 March 2013). 
48 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, 15 Dec, 1999, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4105054.73613739.html, 38 (accessed 
23 Mar. 2013).  
49 “Interview: General Romeo Dallaire,” Ghosts of Rwanda, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
50 Ibid.   
   27 
hundreds of thousands Rwandans. An inadequate mandate, a lack of political will, little 
military resources, and miscommunication served as barriers to adequate protection.  
To be further developed in a later chapter, the prolonged inaction in the former 
Yugoslavia had similarly disastrous for results for the region’s civilians as well as for the 
UN’s credibility. Thousands of Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered within UN-designated 
safe areas. Though the force commander had wished to demilitarize the safe areas, 
“UNPROFOR had the capacity neither to demilitarize nor to defend the safe areas. Of the 
34,000 troops the force commander requested to implement the protection scheme, only 
7,600 had materialized after one year.”51 As a result, these towns were used as bases for 
the Bosnian military and thus served a pretext for attacks by Bosnian Serbs. A weak 
mandate and little manpower, again, contributed to the massacre of thousands. 
The fear surrounding diminished state sovereignty does not go away despite the 
move away from the “right to interfere” framing. The interveners are typically highly 
developed, powerful states, and the intervened-upon are typically of the diametric 
category. As Clifford Owen wrote of the practice, humanitarian intervention is most 
commonly  
an encounter between Western or Westernized nations and non-Western ones, 
between lands where liberal democracy and technology have triumphed and lands 
where they have not . . . It is the white man’s burden purged of its inconvenient 
whiteness. Precisely because it passes for nonpolitical, the relief of suffering 
affords a uniquely noncontroversial ground of political action.52  
 
Owen’s point should be qualified, however: the prevalence of Western states intervening 
in non-Western states could be a result of the contrast between their military arsenals and 
economic power, and there is a history of non-Western, undeveloped states intervening in 
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other non-Western, undeveloped states.53 This phenomenon is not exclusively propagated 
by the white man upon the brown man, but there is no doubt that the more economically 
and militarily strong state is more likely to act to “save” the weaker state.  
Scholars frequently reinforce this fear of a new imperialism cloaked in 
humanitarian concern. In an updated version of Kouchner’s droit d’ingerance, Michael 
Ignatieff subscribes to a right to intervene and makes no pretentions about the 
implications intervention has on state sovereignty. For Ignatieff, the goal of an 
intervention is not to restore a failed state (one that has lost the monopoly over the means 
of violence54 and engages in systemic, gross, repeated violence against its own people55) 
to power, but instead to create a smoothly integrated state that cooperates with the 
international system through regional organizations and economic treaties. In so doing, 
he advocates for a hybrid sovereignty, pointing to NAFTA and the OSCE as examples of 
organizations that do not align with strict Westphalian sovereignty but which serve to 
stabilize states—human rights being better served by the elimination of chaos. Like 
Kouchner, Ignatieff points to WWII as a turning point in the sovereignty debate, saying 
that the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights arose after WWII in 
a response to “the abomination that could occur when the Westphalian state was accorded 
unlimited sovereignty, when citizens of that state lacked normative grounds to disobey 
legal but immoral orders.”56 Before the Declaration, he argues, only states had rights and 
any attempt to abrogate those rights was illegal. Now these rights have become 
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normalized in the international system and are, in fact, a prerequisite to admission to “the 
family of nations.”57 Nation building, part of the intervention continuum, is a replacement 
for les mission civilisatrices. The author calls it “a form of temporary rule that reproduces 
the best effects of empire.” 58 Ignatieff does not shy away from privileging human rights 
over those of states. He acknowledges that enforcing human rights through armed 
intervention can conflict with one’s right to select one’s own government.59 Of course, in 
insisting upon the right to intervene, Ignatieff engages a central debate of humanitarian 
intervention: without state sovereignty, there is no self-determination; without 
intervention, there may be no human rights.  
Fears of a new imperialism gained some traction with NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999. In 1989, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic altered the traditional 
autonomy of Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia.  Exacerbating disagreement over 
autonomy, Kosovo’s ethnic composition was 90 percent Albanian and 10 percent 
Serbian.60 In 1998, conflict between Serbian military and police and Kosovar Albanian 
groups forced 400,000 people from their homes. 2000 people were killed in Kosovo 
between March 1998 and March 1999.61 NATO began a 78-day bombing campaign in the 
former Yugoslavia aiming “to stem Belgrade’s expulsion of ethnic Albanians from 
Kosovo and block a gross violation of international law.”62 NATO’s stated objectives 
were “a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and 
                                                
57 Ignatieff and Gutmann, Human rights as politics and idolatry, 7. 
58 Ignatieff, “State Failure and Nation-building,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, 320-321. 
59 Ignatieff and Gutmann, Human rights as politics and idolatry, 22. 
60 Norman Naimark. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 180. 
61 “NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo,”15 Jul. 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm 
(accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
62 Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” The American Journal of 
International Law 93, no. 4 (1999), 828. 
   30 
repression; the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces . . 
. the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered 
access to them by humanitarian aid organisations”63—all ostensibly noble and moral 
causes. NATO did not, however, ask permission from the United Nations Security 
Council for this operation. Louis Henkin suggests that the threat of a Security Council 
veto prompted the independent action, writing that “after the Cold War, geography and 
politics rendered unanimity by the permanent members in support of military action 
(especially in the Balkans) highly unlikely.”64 Though Henkin points to the illegality of 
intervening without the Security Council’s backing, he offers a possible argument in 
support of NATO’s actions: “Human rights violations in Kosovo were horrendous; 
something had to be done. The Security Council was not in fact ‘available’ to authorize 
intervention because of the Veto. Faced with a grave threat to international peace and 
security within its region, and with rampant crimes reeking of genocide, NATO had to 
act.”65  
Despite the risk of an even higher death toll without NATO’s help, the decision to 
act without the Security Council made the operation suspect for many academics. The 
socialist publication, Monthly Review, wrote of the intervention in Kosovo, “Forget 
humanitarian motives. This is about U.S. global hegemony. And more immediately, it is 
about the role of NATO as the U.S. conduit to Europe, at a time when the European 
Union is developing as a major pole of global capitalism that the United States needs to 
                                                
63 “NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo.” 
64 Louis Henkin, “Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” 825.  
65 Ibid., 826. 
   31 
control.”66 With the end of the Cold War, western capitalism had the opportunity to 
dominate another continent. Kosovo’s location in an oil and mineral rich territory only 
fueled such criticisms. The journal suggests that humanitarian intervention actually 
served as an economic imperialism in order to universalize capitalism.67 Others declare 
that NATO created the conflict between the Serbian government and KLA forces in order 
to force an intervention. 68 The prevalence of differing accounts illustrates the difficult of 
engaging in a military operation without unanimous support. Had all Security Council 
members agreed to this mission, perhaps the operation would have appeared less suspect.  
Furthermore, the intervention in Kosovo creates problematic implications for the 
authority of the Security Council, and the aftermath of the intervention does not provide 
much clarification either. The Kosovo Commission deemed NATO’s actions as  “‘illegal 
but legitimate’ in the sense that the Western countries had performed a legitimate rescue 
of oppressed Kosovars likely to suffer ethnic cleansing under Slobodan Milosevic’s 
leadership but had done so without the Security Council’s legal sanction (unavailable due 
to the threatened Russian and Chinese vetoes).”69  If NATO can act independently, 
technically breaking international law, but remain beyond international reproach, what 
weight does the Security Council actually hold? Without assurance that the United 
Nations will act when faced with a humanitarian crisis, looming genocide or ethnic 
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cleansing, it is difficult to perceive the body as the proper authority nor is there any 
assurance that states or regional organizations are acting altruistically.  
Towards the Responsibility to Protect 
The Responsibility to Protect emerged as a response to the inadequacy of 
protocols associated with the practice of humanitarian intervention and the difficulty of 
resolving sovereignty with human rights. Aforementioned critiques of humanitarian 
intervention practice and theory—the step backwards towards imperialism, the inability 
to ensure self-governance, a focus on the intervener and not on the intervened—informed 
the discussion and development of RtoP. With RtoP, the ICISS hoped to “bridge the gap 
between so-called legitimate (ethically justifiable) and legal (legally authorized) 
intervention.”70 The error of holding fast to a traditional peacekeeping method became 
painfully obvious with Rwandan and Bosnia, and Kosovo highlighted the problem of 
right authority in carrying out military operations. 
Recognizing the lack of regulation surrounding humanitarian interventions, RtoP 
attempts to re-frame and refine the idea of militarily intervening for the purpose of human 
security. Sovereignty concerns, RtoP proponents assert, are second to the “protection of 
individuals against threats to life, livelihood, or dignity that can come from within or 
without.”71 RtoP reformulates human rights-based interventionism, arguing that 
The issue must be reframed not as an argument about the ‘right to intervene’ but 
about the ‘responsibility to protect.’ And it has to be accepted that although this 
responsibility is owed by all sovereign states to their own citizens in the first 
instance, it must be picked up by the international community if that first-tier 
responsibility is abdicated, or if it cannot be exercised.  
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That report insisted on a dual responsibility of sovereignty: “externally—to respect the 
sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the 
people within the state,”72 utilizing the philosophy that sovereignty hinges on the 
behavior of the sovereign.  RtoP, while not giving states the explicit right to intervene 
militarily in cases of mass atrocities, acknowledges the responsibility of the international 
community to respond when a government is unwilling or unable to protect its own 
citizens. The ICISS panel intended for the reactive component of RtoP to remain limited: 
“the responsibility to react—with military coercion—can only be justified when the 
responsibility to prevent has been fully discharged.”73  The Commission reiterated Just 
War principles as key to determining the legitimacy of an intervention. Whatever action 
taken, once preventive measures have been exhausted or are unlikely to work, must be 
motivated by noble intentions, be the last resort, use proportional means to achieve its 
goals, and have reasonable prospects of success.74 Put briefly, RtoP as written by the 
ICISS, “proposes a new international default setting”75 with its codification of prioritizing 
human security over state sovereignty, but its concept of prevention, reaction and 
rebuilding has been seen before.  
The Responsibility to Protect concept was endorsed at the 2005 United Nations 
World Summit, but the RtoP concept originally conceived by the Commission has some 
distinct differences from the ideas expressed in the UN document. The Commission 
favors a broad interpretation of what constitutes an emergency requiring international 
action, stating that RtoP exists  
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in order to halt or avert: large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with 
genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or 
state neglect and inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic 
cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape.76  
 
Though they seem analogous, the version espoused by the United Nations in 2005 
narrows the scope of RtoP to four specific cases: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity. The UN’s negotiation of RtoP limited is applicability and 
reiterated the necessity of Security Council agreement. From 2001 to 2005, the document 
underwent a few significant changes. What follows is the entirety of the endorsement of 
RtoP at the 2005 World Summit: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration 
of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the 
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out. 
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140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General 
on the Prevention of Genocide.77 
Three points emerged from the World Summit Outcome document: sovereigns are 
responsible to their people, institutional commitments to the prevention of mass atrocity 
and improved peacekeeping measures are necessary, and the Security Council is the right 
body to legitimize intervention.78 Gareth Evans, one of the doctrine’s primary authors, 
feels that the changes to in the World Summit Outcome RtoP do not diminish the quality 
of the endorsement and that the concept “survived almost unscathed.”79 The two versions 
are, however, noticeably different. The ICISS report is a small book, while this 
endorsement is only a few paragraphs and describes a more sedate version of RtoP. As 
evidenced by the initial reference the responsibility of individual states, the need to win 
over developing, less powerful states required some concessions. Of additional 
importance is the emphasis on prevention as opposed to reaction. It speaks to the need for 
early warning capability and commits the international community to “helping States 
build capacity to protect their populations.” These two paragraphs reaffirm the sovereign 
power of states and designate the UN as a resource and support for states. It can 
“encourage and help States,” but the paragraph reassures smaller states that their borders 
have not become meaningless.  
The responsibility to react still figures into the UN version of RtoP, but it does not 
resolve key issues surrounding the legitimation of an active response to atrocity. The 
document places the threshold for international action at “manifest failure” to protect 
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populations, but at what point does a lack of protection become a manifest failure? No 
definition exists for that term, and as the document suggests that collective action should 
be considered on a case-by-case basis, no firm answer emerges from this dialogue either. 
Similarly, the World Summit fails to address the possibility of a Security Council 
gridlock. In their text, the ICISS suggests that if the Security Council does not act in a 
timely fashion, the General Assembly should have an emergency procedure or that 
regional organizations take action under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The committee also 
warns that the UN’s stature and credibility are risked by Security Council inaction.80 
There is no mechanism in place to surpass the veto power within the Security Council, 
and the World Summit leaves the response to atrocity little changed.  Instead of providing 
other options if the conventional path fails, the World Summit points solely to the 
Security Council (who should act in a timely and decisive manner). Giving the Security 
Council the sole power to authorize a reaction puts the international community in the 
same position as before: powerless to force the 15 member states into action.  
Conflicting views on RtoP  
 
 RtoP is either hailed as a groundbreaking new conception of sovereignty and 
response to atrocity or as a repackaging of old principles in humans rights language, 
serving little purpose other than to disguise the realpolitik goals of the major powers. 
Much of the literature questions the likelihood of RtoP hastening or facilitating the 
response to humanitarian crises, while other authors fear that the concept allows easy 
exploitation of weak states for non-humanitarian purposes. This paper will argue that a 
nuanced combination of these ideas is the reality. In examining in greater detail the cases 
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of Bosnia in the 1990s and Libya in 2011, one can find evidence that the rhetoric and 
focus of intervention as well as the structural process by which the UN evaluates these 
crises has changed drastically, but that the reality of the intervention’s operationalization 
remains much the same. 
Examining the Security Council for evidence of a shift in the importance of 
human rights enforcement, at first glance, reveals few structural changes. The Council is 
still dominated by the world’s most powerful states and the threat of veto power is still 
relevant. The ICISS, with their initial proposal, had no definitive answer to the problem 
of a reluctant Security Council. They warned, instead, that the UN’s reputation could 
suffer if the Security Council failed to act and also that states would be likely to act 
independently without the approval of the Security Council. As a remedy, they 
recommended a sort of accord by which the Permanent Five members agree to withhold 
their veto powers when the rest of the group is in agreement on a matter of humanitarian 
concern. The ICISS agreed on the importance of the Security Council, but noted that if 
that body fails, “humanitarians and victims are left where the Secretary-General himself 
was in September 1999 when he queried his diplomatic audience about their reactions 
had there been a state or a group of states willing to act in April 1994 even without a 
Security Council imprimateur.”81 Aidan Hehir points to the lack of codified change in the 
UNSC to argue that RtoP represents a means by which major powers can manipulate 
international law for their own benefit. While acknowledging the need for a response to 
atrocity, Hehir finds that RtoP creates little substantive change from previous practice, in 
part due to the inherent structural problems of the Security Council—structurally unequal 
due to veto powers and a slow-moving body. Without a prescription to ensure that the 
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international community absorbs the responsibility of protecting a population in danger, 
the concept remains informal and difficult to operationalize. 82  
Similarly, Daniel Warner’s discomfort with RtoP comes from its inability to 
operate outside of the statist system. RtoP as a concept remains at once paradoxically 
rooted in the concept of state sovereignty—it is the worldview by which the concept is 
imagined—and opposed to it. By allowing or actively participating in intervention, the 
international community is effectively removing and replacing the government of the 
territory with another sovereign. The protection of human life is important, but, Warner 
argues that “by emphasizing human security and human rights as priorities, it has 
weakened the state’s sovereignty without finding a responsible alternative. The 
‘international community’ cannot protect individuals over a long period of time.”83 
Without a strong state system, how can people expect long-term stability and protection 
let alone democratic rule? The question of sovereignty remains a prime stumbling block 
for RtoP’s actualization. How can its proponents argue for a prioritization of human 
security without any real guarantee of a return to independence for the “host” state?  
If pre-RtoP sovereignty was not so limitless, as Hehir suggests, then RtoP does 
not mark a wildly new direction.84 Sovereignty, he writes, had little to do with the 
sluggish response to atrocity in the past; instead, political will determines collective 
intervention. 85 RtoP adds a new way of discussing humanitarian crises, but little else. For 
Kouchner, too, RtoP hardly differs from his conception of the right to interfere. He 
                                                
82 Aidan Hehir, “The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?” International 
Relations 24, no. 218 (2010), 231. 
83 Daniel Warner, “The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical Engagement,” Millennium 
Journal of International Studies 32, no.1 (2003), 114. 
84 The Nuremberg Trials are an example that states could not do as they wished with their own citizens. 
Hehir, “The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?” 230. 
85 Ibd., 229.  
   39 
observes from the name of the Report that “diplomacy clings to its sense of propriety; it 
prefers to speak of ‘intervention for humanitarian protection’ and the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ rather than the ‘right to interfere.’ Be that as it may, there if no difference.”86 The 
two ideas both imply the violation of borders for the purpose of saving lives. 
Gareth Evans, one of the main authors of the Report, finds ample misconceptions 
and misinformation surrounding RtoP. The view that the concept re-packages the 
humanitarian intervention model strikes him as false, saying that humanitarian 
intervention was “coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes—nothing 
more or less,”87 whereas RtoP represents a wide swath of activities and seeks to prevent 
atrocity. To critics who argue that RtoP will give states excuses to engage in modern-day 
imperialism, he argues that they are, in fact, addressing humanitarian intervention not 
RtoP and have not kept up with the debate.88 The failure to respond to tragedy in the past, 
Evans argues, has little to do with the United Nations, but more to do with the lack of 
political will from individual states. A relatively low budget in the UN for peacekeeping 
has not prevented missions from having a high success rate. For him, the development of 
RtoP marks a conceptual victory that has also generated more responsive institutions. The 
third and indispensable challenge, he writes, is that of political preparedness and 
generating will. 89 For Evans, fears of a new imperial machine are too cynical and give 
the international community too little credit, while fears that RtoP is too strong give the 
doctrine more power than it is capable of harnessing.  
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While in some of his writings Bellamy insists upon the revolutionary quality of 
this emerging doctrine, he also acknowledges the difficulty of gauging its efficacy. The 
language of RtoP, he writes, now frames the discussion surrounding these humanitarian 
emergencies, but whether “RtoP is adding value or whether the same (or better) results 
are being achieved by alternative routes (such as regional security architectures) or 
whether (as seems most likely) it is a combination of the two.”90 Perhaps RtoP has 
prevented instances of mass atrocity through its prevention efforts, but testing that 
hypothesis is a difficult proposition. How can one measure what atrocities were 
prevented due to the call for strong diplomatic efforts and early warning systems? 
Though it does not directly reply to that dilemma, this paper searches for rhetorical cues 
to understand how embedded the concept has become in international relations. If the 
vocabulary of RtoP is present in the dialogue of states considering intervention efforts, 
we know at the very least that the concept is on its way to becoming a norm. Despite its 
unclear effect, Bellamy maintains that RtoP has caused a new international consensus 
that the international community can legitimately concern itself with war crimes and 
atrocities within other states.91 Whatever the incidental interests of a state in pursuing a 
military response to a humanitarian crisis, it is acceptable as long as the primary 
motivation is that of saving lives.92     
 The crisis in Darfur unfolded at the same time as RtoP’s UN endorsement; as a 
result, much of the surrounding literature measures RtoP’s success by the outcome in 
Darfur. On one hand, the many steps taken by the UN to express disapproval of the 
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genocide and massive displacement indicate that the UN is taking more seriously its role 
of human protection; on the other hand, no military force made its way into Darfur to put 
an end to the violence. Max W. Matthews asserts that, despite criticisms that the 
international community did not act to prevent genocide in Darfur, “its resolutions . . . 
demonstrate support of the R2P framework. While it is perhaps too early to call these 
resolutions a trend, the references to R2P suggest that the Security Council may be taking 
its responsibility to protect seriously and will continue to act accordingly.”93 In fact, by 
working with the Sudanese government to negotiate a peace, the international community 
aligns with RtoP in all of its complexities and adds credibility to the RtoP doctrine.94 On 
the other hand, Alex de Waal considers the case of Darfur to spell out demise of RtoP. 
The international community did not act to stem the violence, de Waal says, and its 
response “consisted chiefly of ad hoc steps rather than a systematic or strategic approach 
to the crisis.”95 Embarrassingly, the State Department of United States declared that 
genocide had been committed in Darfur while simultaneously declared that this finding 
would not impact US policy.96 Such a statement surely demonstrates that no real 
commitment to RtoP existed.  
 These criticisms of action/non-action in Darfur are well summed up by a debate 
between Bellamy and Weiss. Should RtoP function as a standing policy of prevention, or 
should it be used to rally the troops (literally) in instances of mass atrocity? In 2010, 
Bellamy issued a re-examination of RtoP considering these two opposing viewpoints. 
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Ultimately, he sides with the RtoP of prevention policy. RtoP applies to all states at all 
times; the question is how to implement that concept.97  
  
                                                
97 Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,” Ethics & International Affairs 24, no. 
2 (2010), 158.   
   43 
Chapter 3: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Historical background 
The wars permeating the Balkan region in the 1990s significantly impacted the 
legitimacy of the UN’s peacekeeping model and have come to be held up as a textbook 
example of the wrong way to react to a humanitarian crisis. Many of the subsequent 
reforms efforts, ultimately including RtoP, within the UN were prompted by the 
uncertainty demonstrated in the broader response to Bosnia-Herzegovina. A particular 
problem with the war in Bosnia was an international reluctance to get involved in a 
conflict that was not perceived to be directly related to their own state interests (despite 
its European location). The conflict seemed interior to that region and unrelated to 
American, British, French, or other European interests. In this chapter, I will provide a 
brief history of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and then examine a few key 
speeches from heads of state outside of Yugoslavia—namely, President Clinton and 
President Chirac—to better ascertain the understanding of the role of the international 
community and the reasons for a sluggish response to that crisis. Structural uncertainties 
within international organizations impacted the response to atrocity, too. The United 
Nations and NATO had not yet fully transitioned out of Cold War strategies and 
structures and so were unable to react effectively.  
How did a multicultural entity like the former Yugoslavia descend into genocide? 
The multinational nature of the former Yugoslavian state in combination with the 
instability following the death of a dictator, economic restructuring, and the 
disintegration of the region’s leading power, the Soviet Union, contributed to hostilities 
between Yugoslavia’s member nations. Following the Second World War, Bosnia-
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Herzegovina became part of the Yugoslav Socialist Federation, a multicultural entity 
consisting mainly of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, as well as Slovenes, Macedonians, and 
Montenegrins.98  President-for-life Josip Broz Tito ruled over the Federation, which 
began as a centralized entity,99 but then grew to emphasize autonomy for its different 
ethnic groups under what Gary Bertsch refers to as the Yugoslav ideology of self-
managing socialism.100 Each group had control of a republic within the Federation in 
which they could speak their respective languages. Bosnia-Herzegovina, unlike other 
former Yugoslav states, was marked by its multiculturalism and was home to Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. Within that group, religion was the sole distinguishing 
factor, since the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were racially identical as white Eastern 
European Slavs.101 The capital of Yugoslavia’s location in Serbia, at Belgrade, meant 
that, despite the Federation’s many nationalities, Yugoslavia was “essentially ruled and 
run by Serbs.”102  
 Tito held this union together as President-for-life until his death in May 1980, at 
which time nationalistic politicians came to power throughout the country.103 Following 
Tito, power rotated between presidents from each of Yugoslavia’s republics and 
autonomous regions.104 In 1989, newly elected President Slobodan Milosevic used state-
                                                
98 “Yugoslavia: Society” Library of Congress Country Studies, Dec. 1990, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0006) (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).   
99 Gary K. Bertsch, “Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 433, no. 1 (1977), 89.  
100 Ibid., 90-91.  
101 David Rohde, Endgame (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), xi. 
102 “Talking about Genocide: Bosnia 1995,” Peace Pledge Union Information, 
http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_bosnia.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013);  
See also Bertsch, “Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia,” 97: Serbs comprised about 67 percent of 
all federal employees, though at the leadership level Serbs represented only about 39 percent of federal 
administrators.  
103 Rohde, Endgame, xii. 
104 Stathis N. Kalyvas and Nicholas Sambanis, “Bosnia’s Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics,” The 
World Bank, Jul. 1, 2005, 192.  
   45 
controlled television to gin up nationalist sentiment and to increase public fears of a 
return to a period of Serb suffering.105 Serbian Academy of Sciences released a statement 
corroborating Milosevic’s rhetoric that denounced Tito for his anti-Serbian policies.106 
This trend of hyper-nationalism in combination with the political and economic 
restructuring eventually fractured Yugoslavia and, with the end of Soviet dominance, the 
region further destabilized.  
Elections in 1990 continued Yugoslavia along the same trajectory, as nationalistic 
politicians were elected in Slovenia and Croatia. These states seceded from Yugoslavia in 
1991; Bosnia followed suit in 1992.107 Croatia’s secession prompted an outbreak of 
violence in June 1991 between the Yugoslav Army (JNA) and Croatia militias, the first 
sign of the coming war.108 Though the majority of Bosnians voted for independence in 
1992, the population was sharply divided by ethnic group. While most Bosnian Muslims 
voted for independence, Bosnian Serbs wished to remain part of Yugoslavia (“Greater 
Serbia”).  
In Bosnia, Serbian aggression began almost immediately after the results of the 
secession vote, causing the UNSC to impose economic sanctions in April 1992.109 
Nationalist paramilitary groups from Serbia seeking to expel Bosnian Muslims captured 
the town of Srebrenica in April 1992. Though Muslims attempted to retake the town a 
few weeks later, the Serbs had far greater military resources with tanks and artillery.110 
By March of the following year, 60,000 Bosnian Muslims lived in Srebrenica and its 
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surrounding areas. Eventually, Bosnian Serbs forces, led by Ratko Mladic, edged out the 
Muslim populations, surrounded Sarajevo, and controlled the majority of Bosnia. Non-
Serbs bore the brunt of the displacement, were cut off from access to humanitarian 
organizations by the Bosnian Serbs until mid-1993.111 
As hostilities increased, the United Nations became involved with the whole of 
the Yugoslav region. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), first based in 
Croatia in 1992, continued to expand as the fighting grew more intense. UNPROFOR 
was originally tasked with creating the peace and security necessary for a negotiated 
settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and with protecting three UN 
Protected Areas in Croatia from armed attack.112 The operation endured for three years, 
from February 1992 until March 1995. On May 30, 1992, the Security Council acted 
under Chapter VII to impose sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
demand the free movement of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina.113 In June 
1992, the mission grew to include the maintenance of the security of Sarajevo’s airport. 
By the end of that summer, UNPROFOR was supporting the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the delivery of humanitarian relief in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, its mandate had expanded to allow the use of force when 
responding to attacks against its designated safe areas, and it was enforcing a no-fly zone 
and controlling six safe areas. 114 Because UNPROFOR had fewer military capabilities, 
NATO was on hand to provide air support to UN peacekeepers if needed; the threat of air 
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strikes helped to relieve Sarajevo for a short period of time.115 More peacekeepers were 
deployed that summer to assist in in the humanitarian aid process.  
The cities of Srebrenica and Sarajevo are now known as the locations of war 
crimes and massive civilian losses. Sparked by the shooting deaths of several protesters 
by Serb gunmen, soon Serbs troops were shooting down at Sarajevo from its surrounding 
hills, with Bosnian fighters unable to mount a successful counterattack.116 The attacks 
against Sarajevo are infamous for their purposeful targeting of civilians: “Sniper Alley” 
forced Sarajevans to chance their lives by crossing the street, and market bombings killed 
or injured hundreds.117 The siege of Sarajevo led to the deaths of over 10,000 people over 
the course of three and a half years, a shocking refutation of the city’s lauded image of 
cosmopolitan Europe, a city that defied extreme nationalism with its multicultural 
society. Bernard Henri-Levy, a French public figure and intellectual,118 decried the city’s 
bombardment and pointed to Sarajevo as “the essence of Europe: tolerance and 
coexistence”119 and says that it “stands for a universalist, open, and tolerant Europe, the 
Europe of Maastricht.”120  That Sarajevo was gone for the better part of four years. 
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UN commander Phillipe Morillon gained access to besieged Srebrenica by 
crossing Serb lines and announced that the UN would protect the area.121 The UN named 
Srebrenica a safe area on April 16, 1993, and several other cities were similarly declared 
in May 1993.122 The existence of UN protected towns did not prevent atrocity and, in the 
war’s great tragedy the Bosnian Muslim men and boys of Srebrenica were murdered by 
Serb forces: “two years later, a Serb flag flew where the UN’s once did and 7,709 
Muslim men were missing.”123 By 1993, it became clear that “all parties to the conflict 
were guilty of the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’—the forcible deportation and 
displacement, execution, confinement in detention camps or ghettos, and the use of siege 
warfare, to force the flight of an ‘enemy’ ethnic population.”124 Civilians in Srebrenica 
and Sarajevo were hunted and died for their ethnic identities and religious affiliations. 
Entreaties for peace came in conjunction from the European Community and the 
UN. Lord David Owen of the European Community and Cyrus Vance of the United 
Nations drafted a peace plan early in 1993 for the region that called for Bosnia’s division 
in ten regions—the three ethnic groups would have a majority in three of these regions, 
with the last region being mixed.125 Both the Americans and the states in question met the 
Vance-Owen proposal with intense criticism. This compromise would have divided 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into  
a series of cantons, delineated according to their ethnic majorities . . . The 
Bosnian government balked though, at first unable to accept a division that 
legitimized ethnic cleansing, and still under the false impression that there would 
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be an American intervention. And the Americans, though they had no intention of 
intervening, were unwilling to be seen publicly sanctioning a Bosnian defeat . . . 
which . . . sacrificed the principle of the right of Bosnia, a legal government, to 
assert itself as a state.126  
 
The Bosnian Serb parliament reluctantly approved the plan on January 20; Bosnian-
Croats accepted the plan without hesitation; Muslims challenged the proposed borders of 
the regions.127 By May, however, the plan was dead after being rejected again by Bosnian 
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.128 For Karadzic, the ideal solution seemed to be a straight 
division of the territory in three. In his rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, he asked, 
“‘Why are you pushing us together, like a dog and a cat in the same box?  . . . We can’t 
live together. We should be separated to be good neighbors.’”129   
The second market bombing in Sarajevo on August 28, 1995, the most deadly 
attack during the siege of Sarajevo, spurred NATO into action. As Croatian-Bosnian 
forces took back territory from Serbs, NATO launched airstrikes around the capital, 
targeting Bosnian Serb forces.130 Finally, after 3 years of intense fighting, the 1995 
Dayton Agreement established a ceasefire and created two independent regions within 
Bosnia—the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation. Bosnian Serbs 
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were granted close to half of the territory of Bosnia.131 Outside involvement within the 
region continued, with NATO implementing the peace agreement’s particulars and the 
UN establishing a new mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) focused on 
reconstructing the country through better law enforcement, aid for refugees, and election 
monitoring.132  
Throughout this history, the role of the international community does not become 
clear until several years have passed. The following sections will take a closer look at the 
reticence to become involved in this crisis of human rights. As a case study, Bosnia 
provides a closer look at the lack of clarity surrounding humanitarian intervention after 
the end of the Cold War. Despite new freedom to act, the United Nations and its more 
powerful member states were not sure how best to reconcile the question of respect for 
state sovereignty with upholding human rights. War in the former Yugoslavia 
demonstrates many problems of antiquated peacekeeping and intervention protocols and 
sets up the emergence of RtoP. The rest of this chapter will establish the status quo of 
humanitarian intervention in order to explain the need for reform and a means by which 
to assess the efficacy of those reforms. 
Language and Framing   
 
In determining what sources to analyze, I first considered which actors had the 
most influential roles during the conflict. As the main source of military might in the 
eventual intervention in Bosnia, NATO’s language in its related documents represents the 
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combined intelligence on the conflict. Its statement in 1992 reveals the depth of 
knowledge surrounding the conflict at its early stages. American foreign policy in many 
cases dictates the response of other Western, developed countries; as such, President 
Clinton’s press conferences on Bosnia and his formal speeches required examination. 
Additionally, as a strong member of NATO, France’s position on Bosnia influenced the 
international response. France also has a less isolationist tradition than the United States. 
Because of its central location in Europe and its role as a leading economic power in that 
region, its rhetorical choices may demonstrate a broader European position.  
Specific speeches were chosen for analysis due to their content and the need for 
representative sample. For example, President Clinton’s press conferences did not all 
mention the former Yugoslavia, and some did so only in passing. I chose to focus on a 
few examples wherein the President spent a majority of his time discussing the war. I also 
aim to provide analysis of statements from different stages of the war, mainly from 1992 
to 1995’s Dayton Accords. NATO’s official publications on the mission are critical, too, 
since it played a large role in the operation. In France’s case, we will see some bold 
choices in language, with several comparisons between the war in Bosnia and World War 
Two—a history with which the French continue to grapple.133 These choices attempt to 
provide a broad range of time period and the most accurate representation of each actor’s 
views in order to establish a generalization on the language and framing surrounding the 
response to atrocity, though of course the sample is limited by my inability to dissect 
each mention of Bosnia by in the international media over a five year period.  
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While these examples have import in and of themselves, the main purpose of their 
analysis is to better understand the international norms surrounding what constitutes an 
appropriate response to atrocity. RtoP’s contribution purports to be a new sense of 
urgency and of a commitment to act for the preservation of peace and human rights, 
without a strict fidelity to norms of state sovereignty. An examination of these speeches 
and statements reveals that the crisis in Bosnia was not consistently framed with any 
sense of urgency or duty to react. Of the four sources of framing examined in this 
chapter—the Clinton administration, President Chirac, NATO, and the UN—the 
Americans and the UN are the most unwilling to use strong language condemning the 
atrocities or implicating themselves in any response. 
In reading the words of these influential organizations and leaders, I looked for 
phrases that indicated any sense of obligation to intervene. If the language focused on the 
interiority of the conflict, by speaking of it as distant problem exclusive to the former 
Yugoslavia (a matter of state sovereignty), this would be a cue that the actor felt less 
motivated to engage directly. If, however, the impact of the ethnic cleansing on other 
states was mentioned or war crimes revealed, we would expect to see the conflict framed 
in terms of human rights standards that surpass borders. While, as we will see in NATO’s 
statement below, the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Muslims were well known, 
the American position prefers to remain somewhat neutral, instead calling for an internal 
settlement to the conflict.  It is not until President Chirac’s speech that we see a real 
indictment of the international community for their inaction. On the whole, the rhetoric 
used in the following speeches or statements portrays little sense of a moral obligation to 
protect human life and is very much rooted in the state system. 
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NATO’s Humanitarian Perspective 
NATO’s official position towards war in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 opposes 
its “carnage and lawlessness” and frames the matter largely in terms of human protection. 
While war in that region had spillover potential for the rest of Europe and needed to be 
quickly contained, the risk to “full human rights” is what requires serious negotiations.134 
The organization’s strongly worded statement stands out among speeches by individual 
politicians for its early understanding of the conflict and is quick to point to the crimes 
committed against Bosnian Muslims by Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. NATO’s position 
paper specifically names their crimes, writing that they  
have sought territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous 
practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’. There is the systematic detention and rape of 
Muslim women and girls. Relief convoys are being harassed and delayed. All 
such acts must cease. Those individuals responsible for atrocities, whatever party 
they belong to, are accountable for their actions and liable to be judged 
accordingly. To this end, we welcome consideration of the creation of an ad hoc 
tribunal.135 
 
At the end of 1992, NATO was already able to name many of the atrocities of this war 
which would continue on for three more years. Serb actions, NATO points out, break 
international conventions on human rights, IHL, and disregard the territorial sovereignty 
of Bosnia. NATO attributes the atrocities to the Serb groups and calls for an international 
process of some sort in the form of a tribunal, the first hint of consequences. NATO also 
calls for international observers and preventive forces in the region, indicating that the 
international community has some role to play in mitigating violence, particularly 
because of the interstate nature of the war.  An explosion of violence, according to this 
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document, “would require an appropriate response by the international community,”136 
likely encompassing international conflict prevention measures, peacekeeping forces in 
neighboring states, and embargoes. NATO’s document demonstrates the new emphasis 
on international involvement present in the post-Cold War period, particularly when they 
“urge the Security Council to consider further measures as soon as possible.” 137 The 
Alliance gives an impression of a complete commitment to the cause of protecting human 
life in Bosnia, with little concern for any sovereignty questions.  
Individual States  
 American political rhetoric surrounding the Bosnian War paints a different 
picture, one of less urgency and gravity. Previous discussions of the United States’ role 
within Bosnia focused on the need for containment of the crisis and protecting the 
security of the region as a whole, a perspective informed by the disastrous American 
involvement in Somalia. Images of that defeat had no small impact on the hesitancy of 
the Clinton administration. 
In September 1993, President Clinton met with President Alija Izetbegovic of 
Bosnia, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, to discuss involvement in the war effort. 
Clinton’s rhetoric during the ensuing press conference again demonstrates a cautious 
approach and an unwillingness to become too involved or to promise more than he can 
deliver. He emphasizes the adequate work of the United States on this issue, saying that 
“The United States has done what it could to mobilize the forces of NATO.”138 He places 
the most responsibility on the Serbs and the Croats to reach a “reasonable” decision for 
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peace; if they can accomplishment an agreement, President Clinton would support “the 
United States participating along with the other NATO nations in trying to help keep the 
peace.”139 Underlining the coalition aspect of NATO involvement shifts responsibility 
away from the United States. President Clinton continues on to discuss the need for 
Congressional support before the U.S. contributes to peacekeeping in Bosnia (“Of course 
in the United States, as all of you know, anything we do has to have the support of the 
Congress”140). The primary parties for establishing a peace agreement in Bosnia are the 
direct participants in the conflict. Clinton states, “if there is an agreement that is not 
forced on them but one that is willingly entered into and is fair [we ought to support that 
process]. And if we can get the Congress to support it, then I think we should 
participate.”141 Clinton conditionalizes all of the American commitments to a Bosnian 
peace, placing a primary responsibility on the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, then on 
Congress to approve of American involvement. His response belies no responsibility to 
react, instead portraying the sentiment that any American effort on the part of Bosnia 
would be an immense favor. 
After the first market bombing of Sarajevo in February 5, 1994, little changed in 
the response of President Clinton. In a press conference on February 6, President Clinton 
continued to stress the need for a peace agreement to originate from within Bosnia, 
saying that “the ultimate answer to all this killing is for the three parties to reach an 
agreement that they can live with and honor,”142 placing all parties on the same level and 
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giving them the same responsibility to create peace. Clinton’s rhetoric suggests that states 
outside the conflict are powerless to effect change.143 His plan moving forward from the 
bombing in Sarajevo was to have “the Secretary of State and Ambassador Albright 
continue their consultations with our allies about what next steps should be taken in 
response to this particular incident.”144 Little changed from 1993 to 1994 for the Clinton 
administration—the importance of multilateral agreement among NATO countries and 
the UN as well as the insistence on a Balkan solution for a Balkan problem serve to 
insulate the international community from the war in Bosnia. Sovereignty concerns serve 
as an alibi with which to forgo a reaction.  
After just a few days, on February 9, Clinton took on a more aggressive tone in 
his assessment of the bombing in Sarajevo. The humanitarian crisis of the war, 
particularly the targeting of Sarajevo, takes on greater importance—perhaps indicating 
that, with the very visible atrocity of the market bombing, more political will to react had 
been generated.145 Clinton tells of his outrage “by the brutal killing of innocent civilians” 
and of his belief “that more must be done to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and the murder 
of innocents.”146 To that end, he relays NATO’s promise to conduct air strikes against 
Serb locations if attacks on the city continue.147 His statement accentuates national 
interests, too, with the President discussing a compelling interest in maintaining NATO’s 
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role as a force for peace in the post-Cold War era, the precarious status of refugees, and 
the need to stem “the continuing slaughter of innocents.”148 While President Clinton 
speaks more forcefully of the humanitarian crisis, he also reiterates the limitations of the 
US when acting within NATO and the UN and insists that the role of outside states is to 
facilitate negotiations. As William Perry, the Secretary of Defense stated, “These are real 
interests, and we take them seriously, but they are limited interests, and they have 
different priorities in terms of what is at stake for America. Our actions need to be 
proportional to these interests.”149 No one actor can “impose a peace” within Bosnia,150 
leaving the cessation of hostilities very much in the hands of the Serbs and Bosnians. 
In the midst of the Bosnian War, the Clinton administration was developing a new 
policy on peacekeeping. Presidential Decision Directive 25 was released in May 1994; in 
its preface, it reveals that “Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.S. 
foreign policy. However, as the policy states, properly conceived and well-executed 
peace operations can be a useful element in serving America’s interests.”151 Issues that 
directly affect American interests, according this policy, are worthy of response—
humanitarian crises are a consideration, but not of utmost import. Furthermore, PDD 25 
sought to reduce American contributions to peacekeeping missions from 31 percent to 25 
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percent.152 With such a precedent for US involvement, it is no great surprise that the 
American president preferred not to take a leading role in mitigating the crisis in Bosnia. 
From Secretary of State Warren Christopher, rhetoric veers much more closely to 
humanitarian concerns as opposed to Clinton’s reticent commitment to NATO (perhaps a 
function of their differing roles as diplomat versus commander-in-chief). For Christopher, 
not participating in the establishment of a Bosnian peace would result in “more 
massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a real threat of a wider war, and 
immense damage to our leadership in NATO, in Europe, and the world.”153 He evokes 
the horrors of the Holocaust as an analogous horror, one that Americans of this era knew 
well. The American role in this war is to help establish a lasting peace, ensuring that “the 
people of Bosnia see no more days of dodging bullets, no more winters of freshly dug 
graves.”154 Christopher’s discourse does not include the artful dodging of an explicit 
commitment to the people of Bosnia; it underlines their bleak and fearful lives in a state 
of war. Such a speech breaks with President Clinton’s established talking points of local 
responsibility for the cessation of violence; instead, Christopher appeals to a common 
sense of horror at the outrage that was the Holocaust to provoke an emotional response.  
In France, a new president in 1995, Jacques Chirac, advocated a stronger French 
effort in the Bosnian war. In a Bastille Day speech at the memorial of the Vel d’Hiv 
deportation site,155 President Chirac addressed the plight of the “30000 Musulmans de 
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Srebrenica qui ont été chasses de leur ville dans des conditions parfaitement contraintes 
aux exigences les plus élémentaires des Droit de l’Homme, qui ont été victimes d’un 
phénomène d’épuration ethnique.”156 He is explicit that the crimes committed in this war, 
particularly that of ethnic cleansing, contradict established human rights law.157 Chirac 
continues on to compare the contemporary situation in Bosnia with the problem facing 
Daladier and Chamberlain before the onset of the Second World War,158 thereby accusing 
the Western governments of a policy of appeasement toward Milosevic and the Serb 
forces. He exhorts the great democracies to act against this tragedy, calling out their 
hypocrisy in Bosnia: “Nos grandes démocraties font des discours, donnent des leçons aux 
autres en matière de Droits de l’Homme, en matière de démocratie. Et puis, face aux 
évènements, elles sont étrangement silencieuses et modestes.”159 This critique, which 
could very well be aimed at the United States, points to the neglect of a universal 
commitment to human rights. Even as they speak of the outrage occurring in Bosnia, 
these great democracies do little to halt the occurrence of atrocity.  
United Nations Resolutions  
When assessing the role of the United Nations, Security Council resolutions give 
a clear understanding of the body’s real power and priorities. Two resolutions, one from 
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the beginning of UN involvement in Bosnia and one preceding the massacre at 
Srebrenica, indicate an unwillingness to impose any real limitations on the Bosnian 
Serbs. Firstly, Resolution 743 of February 1992 establishes UNPROFOR for a 12-month 
period. The Security Council writes of their concern that “the situation in Yugoslavia 
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,” which would fall 
under the “primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” 160 These lines establish the Security 
Council’s authority to act as the crisis in Bosnia clearly impacts international peace and 
security. Continuing on, the resolution conveys an amazing confidence in the 
peacekeeping plan: “Convinced that the implementation of the United Nations 
peacekeeping plan . . . will assist the Conference on Yugoslavia in reaching a peaceful 
political settlement.”161 The resolution focuses on the role of the Yugoslav parties to 
bring their conflict to a close while UNPROFOR’s main role is to create the requisite 
peaceful conditions for the negotiation. International cooperation is implied but not 
explicitly demanded—other states are named “all others concerned”—and the 
responsibility to forge a political settlement belongs to the parties directly involved.162     
A later document, Resolution 1004, was written during the crisis of Srebrenica. It 
begins, however, not with a statement of outrage for abuse of civilians, but with a 
reaffirmation of the United Nations Security Council’s  “commitment to the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina;” the second clause remarking on the body’s grave concern “at the 
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deterioration in the situation in and around the safe area of Srebrenica, Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the plight of the civilian population there.”163 The 
placement of these two clauses indicates a prioritization of state sovereignty over human 
rights, as do the consistent references to the duty of the parties to the conflict to cease 
hostilities. There is no mention of any international responsibility or designated function, 
except to demand that UNPROFOR be granted safety and the space to do their work.164  
The framing of the crisis in Bosnia reveals the lack of an established response to 
atrocity. Four of the most important actors internationally were saying very different 
things in terms the situation’s urgent nature and in terms of the international obligation to 
react. In the case of the American decision-making process, an initial reticence to engage 
with the impending crisis in the Balkans, a holdover from the failed intervention in 
Somalia, eventually subsided. In the beginning months of the conflict, “Scant information 
emanated from the conflict to contradict the legitimacy of the administration’s judgment, 
and in the face of a proliferation of ‘objective’ reports from Bosnia, influence on 
American public opinion suggesting a more forceful U.S. response was effectively 
indiscernible.”165 These reports did not inspire moral concern and compassion, and 
therefore sustained the status quo of non-intervention. Only in France, with the election 
of President Chirac, did the international community see a new approach, one that 
avoided the pretense of neutrality and called for an immediate end to genocide. While 
France seems to have understood that it had a role to play in stopping the violence, other 
states and the organizations that represent them had not yet reached that conclusion.  
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Actors  
United Nations   
 
The peacekeeping function of the United Nations has always counter to the basic 
role of armed forces and lacked definition; it follows that peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia 
were not clearly defined. While peacekeeping takes the same form as military 
operations—uniformed, armed soldiers occupying a geographical area—it rejects 
traditional characteristics of war.166 Former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold said, 
“Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do.” While it 
requires a trained military force, peacekeeping also limits that force’s ability to do follow 
its training and engage with a uniformed enemy.  The new international system that 
emerged following the Soviet Union’s demise began to shift expectations for the typical 
peacekeeping mission. Creating additional complications, the UN’s reliance on member 
states to furnish adequate troop numbers limits the response power. If member states do 
not wish to contribute human capital, the organization’s desire to effect change lacks 
teeth. Despite the continual deficit of manpower, UN peacekeeping became much more 
focused on peace enforcement at this time—creating the peace as opposed to observing 
its progress.  
What is clear from the literature surrounding this transitory state of peacekeeping 
versus peace enforcement is that little was clear within the United Nations. Both Chapter 
VI and Chapter VII of the Charter governed these new interventions, which were 
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characterized to varying degrees by coercion.167  According to Tardy, the use of force in 
some of these operations  (including that of Bosnia) reveals “the absence of conceptual 
and doctrinal reflection on the significance of the use of force.”168 While the United 
Nations of the 1990s recognized that it had an expanded role to play in world politics, it 
had not yet determined the extent of their responsibility (much like NATO). This 
uncertainty was evident in the failure to protect Srebrenica when intervening forces 
proved reluctant to strike against the Serbs.169 A holdover from peacekeeping’s non-
intervention tradition, UN troops were unable to engage except in self-defense. Tradition 
still reigned supreme, despite the new world order and the new form of conflict being 
addressed.  
The United Nation’s peacekeeping function began just after the organization itself 
was founded, but its infrastructure was never clearly codified. In May 1948, military 
observers were sent into the Middle East to monitor the conflict between Israel and 
Palestine, acting as go-betweens and working to contain the conflict from escalating.170 
Later, in Kashmir, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, helped local 
officials to supervise a ceasefire, avoiding direct intervention and maintaining strict 
standards of neutrality and impartiality.171 Until the 1980, missions of this kind were 
directed by the UN Office of Special Political Affairs with relatively few staff working 
on peacekeeping affairs. In 1992, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was 
formed and now does the entirety of the planning. Military control of a mission belongs 
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to the appointed Force Commander.172 
 
United Nations Structure   
 
UNPROFOR bore the brunt of UN’s growing pains. That mission “developed into 
the largest, most expensive, and most complex peacekeeping operation in the history of 
the UN . . . In addition to its military forces, the UNPROFOR had a civil department that 
dealt with political, legal, and humanitarian issues.”173 As evidenced in the inclusion of 
multiple diplomatic tools in UNPROFOR, the traditional peacekeeping model of sending 
in some troops to observe the situation would not have been adequate. 
Numerous problems plagued the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Croatia and chief among them is the mission’s status as a strictly 
peacekeeping one. As such, peacekeepers were limited in the use of force. Initially, the 
UN had 14,000 peacekeepers, which “achieved some objectives” but these troops “did 
not prevent ethnic cleansing, detention camps, refugees, killing, and atrocities, 
particularly in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina.”174  
The peacekeeping model during this period did not allow for enforcement measures or 
the use of force, and “missions were established in situations where the guns had not yet 
fall silent, in areas . . . where there was no peace to keep.”175 Though the mission did 
change from a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission to a Chapter VII mission for the benefit 
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of international security, without a commitment from member states to act strongly the 
mission was unlikely to effect significant change. Weiss writes that  
The situation in the Balkans demonstrated that the United Nations can also 
provide the means for governments to pretend to do something without really 
doing very much . . . It can be argued that, ironically, the half measures in Bosnia 
were worse than no action at all. Given their traditional operating procedures and 
constraints, UN soldiers were not strong enough to deter the Serbs. But they 
deterred the international community from the possibility of more assertive 
intervention under Chapter VII because the troops, along with humanitarian 
workers, were vulnerable targets.176  
 
The creation of safe areas for Bosnian Muslims guarded by peacekeeping forces 
backfired, with the infamous massacre at Srebrenica resulting in the loss of thousands of 
men and boys.177 By corralling a large population of Bosnian Muslims in one town and 
leaving them with guards who lacked the permission to protect them, the coalition 
contributed to the ethnic cleansing.  
Putting boots on the ground necessarily involves greater risk to soldiers and 
therefore remains reserved for matters of acute national interest. For the Clinton 
administration, the fear of public opinion prevented the deployment of ground troops, as 
Americans would “not support the spilling of American blood to stop Bosnians killing 
Bosnians.” 178 As a result, air strikes and safe zones defined the peacekeeping approach. 
The safe areas arose as an attempt to compromise with the American approach of arming 
Bosnian Muslims as well as bombing Serbian targets and with the non-aligned group on 
the Security Council.179 Establishing the safe areas, created a new problem—the UN had 
to maintain an appearance of impartiality, so safe areas were demilitarized. An 
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inadequate number of troops could not defend against Serbian forces and proved that air 
strikes cannot adequately replace boots on the ground.180  
Gareth Evans finds several problems with the UNPROFOR mandate. Its 
ambiguous nature impacted the show of force and indicated a lack of political will. By 
requiring the force commander and the secretary-general to agree on any coercive 
responses, reaction time stalled. The impartial nature of peacekeeping operations at the 
time forced the UN to work within the failed state—asking permission to operate and 
cooperating with the local government.181 Permission of the state as a prerequisite for 
international action diminished the likelihood of a swift end to violence. While the 
UNPROFOR mission provided needed food aid, “critics argue that even if the UN 
prevented starvation by feeding people in besieged towns and cities, it did little or 
nothing to stop the Bosnian Serbs from shelling these areas and ethnically cleansing them 
of Muslims.” 182 Of what utility is food aid when it prolongs war and creates what David 
Rieff refers to as “well-fed corpses?” 
Bosnia reveals many problems of the international response to atrocity. Initial UN 
involvement in the former Yugoslavia, “achieved some objectives, but there was massive 
ethnic cleansing, detention camps, refugees, killings, and atrocities.”183 Only with the 
disclosure of the concentration camps did the discourse change by mobilizing political 
opposition:  
This view of a well-coordinated, systematic campaign of violence was reinforced 
in early August with the disclosure of Serb-controlled concentration-style camps 
in Bosnia. The images were haunting and, for many, conclusive proof that the 
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Bush administration was deliberately distorting the events in Bosnia, especially 
given its initial response to downplaying the reports on the camps.184  
 
Appealing to the moral concern and sense of humanity worked for the liberal 
interventionists, though not until after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and 
targeted violence had begun.  
NATO   
A number of institutions suffered crises of legitimacy and purpose as a result of 
the war in the former Yugoslavia, NATO and the UN chief among them. Eliminating the 
crisis in Bosnia was not, however, the sole task of these organizations: a previously 
binary world order had been upended, throwing into question the role of these 
institutions. With little clarity of vision, both institutions produced a muddled and slow 
response to the genocide in Bosnia. At its conclusion, however, they both entered into a 
period of reflection and reform that changed their goals and operating procedures to 
better reflect the political realities of the post-Cold War environment. In order to 
determine if RtoP represents a change in the international response to atrocity, we must 
first examine the previous model, looking for the original criticisms and whether the 
experience of Bosnia shifted internal structure and emphases.   
NATO’s original purpose as a check to the Soviet influence required re-
assessment after the fall of the Soviet Union. Without the looming threat of the eastern 
bloc, many member states decreased their budget and military personnel allotments. 185 
While NATO was sorting out its new philosophical underpinnings, the war in the former 
Yugoslavia was raging on. NATO, as seen in the earlier section, knew of the war’s 
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atrocities early on and acted in a supporting role to UNPROFOR. The Alliance 
contributed a variety of support missions for UNPROFOR, including a maritime 
enforcement operation to support the embargo and air operations to monitor the no-fly 
zone, but it was not until the conclusion of the Dayton Accords that NATO took a lead 
role, creating the Implementation Force (IFOR).186  IFOR was the manifestation of 
NATO’s new focus areas—out-of-area deployment, shifting headquarters, and lighter and 
faster forces. This mission was its first peace support operation.187  
An assessment by the Command and Control Research Program praises NATO’s 
involvement because it effectively followed through with its threats, in contrast with the 
UN: 
The threat of force, if it is to be effective, will sooner or involve the use of force. 
For example, the same UN soldiers in Bosnia under a different command and 
mandate essentially turned belligerence into compliance over night, 
demonstrating that a credible threat of force can yield results. Unlike 
UNPROFOR, the NATO-led Implementation Force was a military success and 
helped to bring stability to the region and to provide an ‘environment for hope’ in 
which a nation can be reborn.188 
 
IFOR, beginning after the Dayton Accords, certainly helped rebuild the area. And it is 
also true that NATO’s air strikes against Bosnian Serbs attacking Sarajevo hastened the 
end of the war, but these efforts did not come until late in the war (and after the Dayton 
Accords, in the case of IFOR). Additionally problematic, the number of troops necessary 
to get the job done far exceeded the number of troops that could realistically be attained. 
Why did NATO’s intervention occur so late in the game? Peter Barschdorff 
attributes the lag to five factors: the changing nature of NATO, the high risk of an 
intervention for soldiers, the need for a stronger UNSC mandate, the goal of containment, 
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and the tension between the UN and NATO.189 At the time of the war, NATO was 
“mutating from a defense alliance to a multi-functional security institution,”190 and its 
Cold War defense strategies proved outdated in the Bosnian war. Instead of a focus on 
territorial defense, in which units “were characterized by their large, heavy equipment 
and  . . . their lack of deployable combat support and combat service support 
capabilities.”191 With the Cold War over, NATO began to restructure with the creation of 
NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs).192 These new forces were lighter, more 
quickly reactive, and able to operate outside of member states. Though NATO was 
deploying some troops in this new peacekeeping capacity, it was operating in what De 
Wijk referred to as a ‘conceptual vacuum.’ The United States had to take on a lead 
command role because “NATO lacked a doctrine for out-of-area operations, which 
caused problems with regard to formulation of both political objectives and the military 
means to achieve.”193 NATO found it impossible to react properly to unorthodox 
confrontations with the Serbs (like the taking of hostages and their militia system).194   
While NATO was supporting UNPROFOR, the framework in which the 
organizations operate differs vastly—the UN’s impartiality necessarily conflicts with 
NATO’s tendency to throw its weight behind one party.195 Conflicting understandings of 
authority contributed to tension between the UN and NATO. The authorization of air 
strikes, in particular, problematized their interactions. As a result of both sides desiring 
control over these strikes, the dual-key concept was created and required both institutions 
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to agree on air strikes.196 With internal disagreement on the use of air power, “the warring 
factions realised that the ‘dual-key’ arrangements prevented an immediate and effective 
response to violations of the exclusion zones . . . The threat of airstrikes was effectively 
neutralised as a result of UNPROFOR’s vulnerability and natural reluctance to 
compromise its own mission.”197  
 The mission in Bosnia proved to be altogether different from its previous mode of 
operation. NATO’s “focus was on providing for immediate and collective self-defence, 
rather than on setting political objectives, operating under a UN or OSCE mandate and 
integrating operations with those of other organisations,”198 but it realized after working 
with UNPROFOR that such a philosophy would not succeed in the post Cold War 
environment. It began to cooperate militarily as well as politically.199 NATO’s structure, 
as a result of their experiences in Bosnia, became more conscious of the need for civil-
military cooperation and “reconfirmed that military success alone cannot guarantee 
overall success in a peace-support operation.”200  
While the philosophical divide between NATO and the UN did complicate the 
mission’s progress, their overall relationship was “characterised by a desire for mutual 
understanding and common solutions.”201 NATO had never interacted with other 
intergovernmental institutions, and due to its involvement in Bosnia became better 
partners with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the 
Western European Union. NATO continued to expand in 1994 with its Partnership for 
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Peace program that allowed individual states to deepen their relationship with the 
Alliance. This system was practical as well as idealistic: “it made good military sense to 
build upon existing forces and infrastructure in theatre . . . [NATO] also wanted to 
demonstrate that not just NATO, but a broad segment of Europe and the international 
community was committed to implementing a peace agreement.”202 
In a speech by Richard Holbrooke, the vision for a new NATO indicates some 
fundamental changes—a lighter, more agile, and less Eurocentric force. The role of the 
United States, despite the extinction of its longtime adversary, continued to be relevant. 
Holbrooke paints a picture of a united Europe and United States, saying that, “The United 
States has become a European power, an enduring and essential element of a stable 
balance.”203 NATO’s role, however, has changed drastically. It no longer operates 
directly against Russia nor follows a strategy of containment.204  Instead, the new 
NATO’s purpose is the defense of peace in Europe as a whole, “either on NATO territory 
or—pursuant to a mandate from either the UN or the OSCE—in areas of instability or 
crisis.”205 The onset of the Bosnian crisis occurred before NATO could reform its Cold 
War strategies, or perhaps before it knew that such strategies would be irrelevant. With 
the new emphasis on partnerships with non-member states and a more reactive military 
force, the organization seeks to avoid another failure like the one resulting from the 
prolonged inaction in Bosnia.  
Twenty years later, the international community has learned from many of the 
mistakes of Bosnia. Different criticisms have become more prominent, however, and the 
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following chapter will provide a parallel analysis of Libya—its framing, the actions of 
key players, and the operations—to determine to what extent RtoP has made an impact 
on the response to atrocity.   
   73 
Chapter 4: Libya 
Historical Background  
 
 International involvement in Libya did not begin and end with the intervention of 
2011. This country has figured prominently in international relations for decades. The 
eccentric despotism of its former leader, Col. Qaddafi, a tradition of state-sponsored 
terrorism and antagonism towards the U.S., as well as a recent détente period during the 
Bush administration’s War on Terror all secured Libya a place in world happenings. 
While many states have abysmal human rights records, not all undergo interventions. 
Understanding the quick international response to Qaddafi’s threats requires some 
knowledge of his regime’s operations. Here follows a brief history of Qaddafi’s rule over 
Libya, before the discussion of the international community’s response. This chapter will 
follow a similar format as the preceding one, with sections devoted to the framing of 
events, the role of international organizations and state actors, and with commentary on 
the operations.  
A history of foreign rule had impacted the national consciousness and its effects 
can be seen in Qaddafi’s rule. After colonization at the hands of Italy, Libya was 
liberated with the help of the Allied troops in World War II. The presence of foreign 
troops, however, did not improve life for the average Libyan: only 6 percent of the 
population was literate, the economy was in shambles, infant mortality rates rose 
significantly, and no infrastructure existed.206  This history of foreign rule and its 
impoverishing effects created a distrust of Western power and strong anti-colonial 
sentiments.   
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Colonel Muammar Qaddafi took power in 1969 as part of a group of military 
junior officers. They were known as the “Revolutionary Council” but Qaddafi quickly 
emerged as its leader. He created an environment of repression, with severely restricted 
civil liberties and political action only permissible when in support of the regime. 
Qaddafi even altered Islam, molding it to fit his model for Libya. The Great Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as he renamed the state, espoused a system of direct 
democracy through its General People’s Congress but it was anything but democratic in 
practice. Civil society groups were extremely weak due to internal repression and fear of 
reprisal, and religious groups were subject to governmental supervision. While the 
government did release over one hundred political prisoners in 2010,207 other reports of 
torture and arbitrary arrest abound. Human Rights Watch mentions the “hundreds of 
disappearance cases in connection with a massacre at the Abu Salim prison in 1996,”208 
an occurence that would play an important role in 2011. Libya severely restricted civil 
liberties, specifically the freedom of expression. Laws technically condoned free speech, 
however, speech had to fall “‘within the limits of public interest and principles of the 
Revolution.’”209  Government ownership of all print and broadcast media made 
absolutely concrete the inability to speak out against government actions.  
In terms of its foreign affairs, Libya had antagonistic relationships with Western 
states, particularly the U.S., for most of Qaddafi’s rule. Qaddafi used oil embargoes to 
challenge the West in the 1970s and aligned Libya with the former Soviet Union. A 
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common association made with Libya is state sponsored terrorism, with the 1988 
Lockerbie bombing over Scotland being preeminent in most people’s minds. Two years 
prior, Libya had targeted American military personnel with a 1986 bombing in a Berlin 
nightclub. The Reagan administration reacted strongly, bombing several sites in Libya, 
including Qaddafi’s own residence. The explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland, resulted in 
the deaths of 270 people—many American. Investigations quickly faulted Libya for the 
attack. The UN enacted an air and arms embargo in 1992 but it was not until 1999 that 
Libya the two suspects.210 While the Libyan government did eventually pay reparations 
to victims of the attack in 2003, the convicted bomber returned home to a hero’s welcome 
in 2009, indicating that, despite its growing moderation, Libya maintained its 
unpredictable nature.  
The new millennium began a trend towards greater regional and international 
involvement for Libya. Qaddafi announced an end to his country’s weapons of mass 
destruction program in December 2003, prompting the United States to lift the trade 
embargo in September 2004.211 With all embargoes and sanctions lifted, Libya’s oil 
economy grew drastically. Before 2011, Italy relied on Libya to supply over 20 percent of 
its oil supports; Switzerland, France, Ireland, and Austria all imported large quantities of 
oil from Libya, as well.212 The state was able to improve its economy while forging ties 
with developed states. Within Africa, Qaddafi encouraged economic and political 
development by establishing “a $5bn fund that invested in hotels, mobile phone 
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companies, mosques and mining companies across Africa. He also did more than any 
other leader to ensure the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002.”213 The country 
also became more involved in transnational bodies, with Qaddafi serving as chair of both 
the African Union in 2009 and in the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 2003 (despite 
outcries from human rights organizations). Libya applied for World Trade Organization 
membership, indicating a willingness to privatize some industries and become more 
capitalistic. During his time in AU leadership, Qaddafi signaled a desire to create a 
unified African continent, though other African leaders rejected the haste with which he 
wished to proceed.214  
With such stark conditions domestically and with diminished international 
pressure on the Qaddafi regime to reform, few people expected the revolution of 2011.215 
But when Mohammed Bouazizi of Tunisia set himself on fire in December of 2010 to 
protest his inability to find work,216 he provided the catalyst for a series of protests (now 
called the Arab Spring) that spread throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa in 
protest of government corruption and economy misery. By mid-January of 2011, 
President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia had fled; by late January, Egypt erupted in 
protests. Yemen, Bahrain, Syria all followed suit. 217 In Libya, the Arab Spring erupted 
following the arrest of a human rights activist and lawyer, Fathi Terbel. Terbel was 
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arrested in mid-February because of his representation of the families of the Abu Salim 
victims—a massacre of 1,300 prison inmates on the order of Col. Qaddafi’s brother-in-
law and the head of military intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi.218 Libyans began 
demonstrating on February 17, sparking a riot and a harsh response from government 
forces. At least a dozen civilians died from military gunfire, and Gadhafi threated to 
death to all who rebelled against his government. As fighting raged on between 
government forces and the civilian fighters, rebel leaders in Benghazi “called on Western 
powers to conduct airstrikes against the ‘strongholds of the mercenaries’219 and any 
equipment ‘used against civilians and people.’”220 Demonstrations continued to gain in 
numbers and in intensity, and the cities of Misrata and Benghazi were both under the 
control of anti-government rebels by February 24.221 An interim government, known as 
the National Transitional Council (NTC), released its founding statement on March 5, 
2011, which concludes with the following statement: “We request from the international 
community to fulfill its obligations to protect the Libyan people from any further 
genocide and crimes against humanity without any direct military intervention on Libya 
soil.”222 
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Despite many defections from the Libyan military, loyalist forces continued to 
press on at the behest of Gadhafi. In a radio address on March 16, Gadhafi told rebels in 
Benghazi that his soldiers would search every house in the city for them and promised 
“no mercy and no pity.”223  By March 17, the country was still in upheaval and Libyan 
forces were attempting to take back lost territory with tanks and artillery. Saif al-Islam 
Gadhafi, the Col. Gadhafi second son, threatened that “Everything will be over in 48 
hours.”224 The BBC reported that calls for a no-fly zone from the civilian rebel armies 
were growing more desperate. The NTC’s representative in Benghazi said that without 
any intervention, there would be a massacre, a perspective corroborated by the Libyan 
representative to the UN who had defected. State TV gave the people of Benghazi a 
deadline of midnight on March 16 to abandon all rebel strongholds in the city. 225  
The weeks of fighting and the Qaddafi regime’s commitment to the extermination 
of all dissenting civilians prompted the international community to step in. The Security 
Council passed Resolution 1970 on February 27, a first step in limiting Qaddafi. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1970 made use of the RtoP vocabulary (“Recalling the 
Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population”226) and demanded an end to 
the violence, gave the International Criminal Court jurisdiction, imposed an arms 
embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze on the Qaddafi family and associates.227 The 
UN General Assembly suspended Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council on 
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March 1, and aid agencies began to send in workers. As violence grew, it proved to be a 
threat to international stability: neighboring states found themselves burdened with a 
massive influx of refugees.228 President Obama demanded that Qaddafi step down from 
power in early March. After the Arab League’s March 12 request for a no-fly zone, On 
March 17, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, marking the beginning of a 
multilateral military effort to halt the conflict in Libya.229  
Extremely important for justifying international action in Libya were the multiple 
requests for assistance from rebel forces and the Arab League’s request for a no-fly zone 
in Libya’s airspace.230 Resolution 1973 authorizes member states to “take all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” and establishes a no-fly 
zone in Libya’s airspace.231 To fulfill this mandate, first the US and then NATO 
(represented militarily by the US, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Canada) undertook 
Task Force Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector, a mission “designed to 
cripple Muammar Gaddafi’s air defenses.”232 While the US deferred to European 
command for the majority of the operation, most aircraft, tankers, and military hardware 
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came from American resources.233 A US Department of Defense press release from 
March 19 says that Task Force Odyssey Dawn’s goal is to “protect the Libyan people 
from the country’s ruler . . . the coalition also wants to degrade the ability of Moammar 
Gadhafi’s regime to resist a no-fly zone being implemented.”234 The coalition utilized air 
strikes, targeting the Western part of the country; specifically, the attacks targeted Libyan 
defense systems with the aim of opening up access for humanitarian organizations. 235   
According to Navy Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, the American commander of the 
mission, the coalition considered “Gadhafi’s forces that are not complying with the U.N. 
Security Council resolution” when determining the locations of their air strikes in order 
to “produce more of an effect.”236  
The rebels advanced with the help of the air strikes, taking Misrata on May 15, 
and eventually surrounding Gadhafi in Tripoli in late July. By June 2011, 13 states 
recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (though not as 
the legal representative of Libya).237 On October 20, rebel forces captured and killed 
Gadhafi near his hometown of Sirte, ending the rebels’ struggle to depose their 
authoritarian leader and beginning the country’s struggle towards a new government.238  
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This mission is commonly considered the first usage of RtoP to justify military 
action due to Resolutions 1970 and 1973’s mention of Libya’s responsibility to protect 
the Libyan population.239 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
called Resolution 1973 an important demonstration of the international dedication to 
RtoP.240 The Resolutions do not, however, explicitly mention the RtoP doctrine’s other 
facets—including the responsibility of other states to react—indicating a partial rejection 
of the concept. As Libya continues on its path to a more democratic government, 
numerous questions remain over NATO and the UN’s actions and what they mean for the 
future of the responsibility to protect. Analyzing the events of 2011 with an 
understanding of a pre-RtoP reaction to large-scale human rights violations highlights 
two main points: the growing importance of RtoP with the diminishing emphasis on state 
sovereignty, and that the concept is not infallible.  
In order to better assess to what extent Libya fulfilled the RtoP paradigm, thereby 
marking a clear distinction from the peacekeeping and intervention paradigm of the 
1990s, this chapter follows a similar format as the previous one: a discussion of the ways 
in which political actors frame the crisis and their role in it, the institutional 
developments, and the actual events. Throughout this chapter, I will draw comparisons to 
the previous discussion of the war in the former Yugoslavia in order to assess any 
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changes. Such comparisons do not intend to suggest that the cases are identical, but rather 
that they represent two different epochs of humanitarian intervention philosophies. 
Language and Framing 
In the coming pages, I will highlight some main framing themes present in the 
discussion leading up to and during the intervention in Libya. Two decades after Bosnia, 
the discussion of an impending atrocity garners much more urgent debate with many of 
the phrases indicative of RtoP present in speeches. While much has changed in the world 
since the war in Bosnia, France and the United States are still two key players militarily. 
Rhetoric from both the American and the French presidents reveals an emphasis on the 
moral obligation to assist in the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Libya. France, firstly, is 
a consistent participant in humanitarian operations and interventions and played a large 
part in motivating the U.S. and other European countries to contribute military resources 
in Libya. And, as the main military power, American rhetoric surrounding the crisis in 
Libya must be considered. Many more states were involved in the decision-making 
process, but not all will be discussed here.241  
France’s Allegiance to Humanitarian Intervention  
President Sarkozy, in March 2011, explained his administration’s support for the 
NATO operation by citing the democratic zeitgeist of the Arab Spring: “Des peuples 
arabes ont choisi de se libérer de la servitude dans laquelle ils se sentaient depuis trop 
longtemps enfermés. Ces révolutions ont fait naitre une immense espérance dans le cœur 
de tous ceux qui partagent les valeurs de la démocratie et des droits de l’hommes . . . ces 
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peuples arabes ont besoin de notre aide et notre soutient. C’est notre devoir.” 242 Because 
of the overwhelming pull of democratization in the region, the Libyan people had a new 
will to pursue a regime of human rights. According Sarkozy, western states like France, 
because of their status as bastions of human rights and democracy are obligated to help 
them succeed in their efforts.  
Despite international involvement in the struggle, Sarkozy insists on the Libyan 
ownership of the conflict. The revolution belongs to the Libyan people and is not an 
effort to re-colonize or exert undue influence over a smaller state: “L’avenir de la Libye 
appartient aux Libyens. Nous ne voulons pas décider à leur place. Le combat qu’ils 
mènent pour leur liberté est le leur. Si nous intervenons aux cotés des pays arabes, ce 
n’est pas au nom d’une finalité que nous cherchions à imposer au peuple libyen, mais au 
nom de la conscience universelle qui ne peut tolérer de tels crimes.”243 The motivation 
for the state of France to participate in this campaign is purely moral, according to this 
address. It is a universal conscience that guides their foreign policy. Sarkozy’s rhetoric is 
keenly conscious of Bosnia’s legacy and of France’s role before history [son role devant 
l’histoire]. France, as a key supplier of military force and leadership in both Bosnia and 
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Rwanda, very publicly failed to save lives in the early 1990s.244 Libya would perhaps 
prove that they could do better.    
With a political culture steeped in humanitarian intervention, it is not surprising 
that France would have taken a lead on advocating an intervention in Libya. In addition 
to the historical French support for international involvement, there are several 
contemporary explanations for the state’s strong call for action. France’s insistence on 
intervention stems, in part, from a desire to atone for previous missteps during the Arab 
Spring. Sarkozy’s administration, in particular French Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-
Marie, “offered the Tunisian government official help in dealing with protesters”245 and 
the same minister had vacationed in Tunisia the previous winter. This blunder affected 
French domestic politics as well as its international reputation. With a competitive 
election looming the following, President Sarkozy needed to advance a strong image.  
Tumultuous financial crises within the Eurozone during the same period also affected 
intra-E.U. relations. Germany took the lead on all matters financial and abstained from 
the UN Security Council vote on taking action in Libya,246 leaving France with the need 
to reassert its dominance in the realm of foreign policy.247 As seen from the 
miscalculation on the commencement of the Arab Spring in addition to the financial 
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tension with Germany, contemporary happenings in Europe influenced the extent to 
which France took the lead on the Libya issue.   
France’s history of public intellectualism further complicates their involvement. 
President Sarkozy was the first head of state to acknowledge the legitimacy of Libya’s 
National Transitional Council (NTC). Bernard-Henri Levy, a cultural commentator and 
philosopher whom we encountered during the previous chapter, revealed his role in this 
decision by acknowledging that he arranged the decisive meeting on March 10, 2011, 
between the president and the NTC at Elysée, wherein President Sarkozy granted 
‘diplomatic recognition’ to these unelected members of the NTC. Levy lauds this move 
as a “powerful political act, this decisive act of sovereignty, this act that would break 
with all custom.”248 This move does indeed break with traditional understandings of 
sovereignty. While RtoP does hold that a sovereign who abuses his people loses 
legitimacy, it does not define the process for replacing that sovereign. Returning to 
Sarkozy, his rhetoric seems to allow for a return to normal relations with Qaddafi: “La 
porte de la diplomatie se réouvrira au moment où les agressions cesseront.”249  
Levy places the purpose of the mission of the Libya intervention strictly as that of 
civilian protection, but he too equivocates on the role of regime change. International 
action is required to “prevent the bloodbath Gadhafi is anticipating. And, beyond that, to 
break the military machine that Gadhafi . . . had turned against his own people. Protecting 
civilians, then, is putting the army and the power of Gadhafi out of commission.”250 Levy 
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stresses the need to remove Qaddafi despite RtoP’s insistence that regime change is 
outside its purview. He goes on to proclaim that the reason for the operation’s legitimacy 
is its strict adherence to the legal framework and its UN mandate.251 If regime change is 
necessary to the completion of the mission, and regime change does not reside within the 
legal framework, what is the effect on the operation’s legitimacy? 
Also supporting the Sarkozy administration’s tendency to intervention, cabinet 
member Bernard Kouchner, the former head of MSF known for his bombast and direct 
action in humanitarian matters, served as the foreign minister. The ‘right of intervention’ 
remains Kouchner’s famous contribution to the humanitarian intervention debate and, as 
such, Kouchner encouraged a French foreign policy centered on a value-based system of 
diplomacy. He argued that France’s objective “is not only about defending France’s 
interests and guaranteeing its security, but also about ‘the image we have of ourselves’, 
and the promotion of human rights.”252 Kouchner was vocal in his desire to expansively 
apply the responsibility to protect, notably in Burma (Myanmar). While the RtoP does 
not include natural disasters, Kouchner argued that “nothing can possibly justify disaster 
victims seeing themselves denied the basic right to benefit from the necessary aid and 
stresses her commitment to the implementation of the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle 
under all circumstances.”253 A Sarkozy administration, then, favored an expansive 
understanding of RtoP and the possibility of intervention.  
Statements made by President Jacques Chirac during the prolonged crisis of 
inaction in Bosnia do not differ drastically from these words of 2011. He drew parallels 
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to Srebrenica with the horrors of World War Two and called out those great democracies 
that spoke in favor of human rights but refused to act to enforce them. Measuring the 
impact of RtoP on the French government is not so clear-cut, especially with their history 
of supporting similar ventures.  The Sarkozy administration, in several instances, wanted 
an even more expansive RtoP, suggesting that the concept acted as a justification for an 
intervention they would have participated in anyways.  
The American Perspective  
From the beginning stages of civil unrest in Benghazi until the present, the Obama 
administration has indicated a general support for the plight of the civilian protesters and 
rebels. The administration’s rhetoric grew stronger as the conflict dragged on. President 
Obama gave a speech on February 23, 2011, exhorting the Libyan government to refrain 
from the use of violence against its people. He reminded the regime of its responsibility 
to uphold the human rights of its people and insisted that the government “be held 
accountable for its failures to meet those responsibilities.”254 This speech aligns with 
RtoP’s philosophy because it does not allow a sovereign to maintain legitimacy when 
disregarding the well being of its people. Obama points out that all governments share an 
equal responsibility to their citizens and that when the government is unable to aid its 
people, it must “allow humanitarian assistance to reach those in need.”255 As a warning to 
Qaddafi, Obama’s speech seeks to remind him of his obligation as a leader to safeguard 
the civilian population and be responsive to their wishes—the central tenet of the RtoP 
doctrine. President Obama structures his speech in such a way that he addresses all three 
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facets of RtoP—prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. A resounding theme of his February 
23 speech is reconciling national interest with what is just.  Though intervention involves 
major risks and costs, those factors “cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of 
what’s right.”256 A policy of isolation cannot be considered morally tenable, though the 
President also acknowledges that intervention is not always possible. In the case of 
Libya, he points to widespread support to legitimize military action—a multilateral 
intervention with a UN mandate as well as requests for assistance from a large segment 
of the Libyan civilian population and insists that  “we have a responsibility to act.”257   
As the conflict in Libya raged on and international involvement became possible, 
President Obama’s initial reluctance to involve the United States militarily gave way and 
public commentary shifted to the justification of the use of force. In a likely reference to 
the disastrous non-interventions of the 1990s, Obama says that “as President, I refused to 
wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”258 This refusal 
speaks not only to the President’s priorities, but also to the input of his advisers. During 
the Oval Office meeting to discuss the looming massacre in Benghazi, the president 
called for input from each of his advisers. Samantha Power, National Security Council 
senior aide and human rights advocate, and Susan Rice, ambassador to the United 
Nations and former Africa adviser to the Clinton administration during the Rwanda 
genocide, favored stronger action than the implementation of a no-fly zone.259 Power had 
made her name with a book about the American government’s tendency to ignore modern 
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genocides, and several other staffers had been in the Clinton administration during the 
Rwandan genocide. As a result, “‘The ghosts of 800,000 Tutsis were in that room”260 
informing the deliberations. With the Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton pushing 
for intervention, the three women were able to secure both the President’s approval and 
support from the UN Security Council.261 Instead of the no-fly zone that the President 
viewed as “a show to protect backsides, politically,”262 he decided to push for a U.N. 
backed intervention. Not intervening, he said, was “‘not who we are.263’” President 
Obama’s language differs drastically from that of President Clinton during the early 
1990s. Whereas the ghosts of Rwanda visited Obama’s oval office, ghosts of American 
serviceman haunted the Clinton administration. Clinton’s press conferences and speeches 
showed a hesitancy to involve American troops in any military operation not directly 
affecting national security, a perspective informed by the disaster in Somalia.  
By highlighting the intermediary steps taken by the US and NATO member 
states, Obama speaks to the preventive action requisite of any intervention. On March 28, 
after the approval Resolution 1973 allowing all necessary means of civilian protection in 
Benghazi, the president details the escalating international response, from an evacuation 
of American citizens, to the freezing of the regime’s assets, sanctions, and an arms 
embargo, all while making “it clear that Qaddafi had lost the confidence of his people and 
the legitimacy to lead.”264This speech emphasizes the military response as a last resort 
action, only taken after having exhausted all other options. Central in creating a moral 
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impetus to respond are the accounts of atrocities by the regime. Qaddafi’s escalation of 
hostilities is the most important justification in this speech, with imagery focusing on the 
attacks against innocent civilians. In the following excerpt, Obama portrays a ferocious 
madman with an unyielding dedication to punishing dissidents:  
In the face of the world’s condemnation, Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, 
launching a military campaign against the Libyan people.  Innocent people were 
targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked.  Journalists were 
arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed.  Supplies of food and fuel were choked 
off.  Water for hundreds of thousands of people in Misurata was shut off.  Cities 
and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and apartment buildings 
reduced to rubble.  Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon 
people who had no means to defend themselves against assaults from the air.265     
 
Obama returns to two points in this speech: that Qaddafi is a very bad man in 
violation of internationally recognized core principles of governance, and that the use of 
force is one agreed-upon measure to remedy that infraction. With his speech, the 
President acknowledges that America should not act unilaterally on matters of 
humanitarian crisis, though he reserves the right to do so, but he also acknowledges the 
difficulty of ensuring a humanitarian solution without a political one. While he would 
prefer that Qaddafi were out of power, “broadening our military mission to include 
regime change would be a mistake.”266 Finally, Obama continues to emphasize the 
importance of the popular voice in Libya, mentioning several times the opposition 
group’s request for external assistance. By including their perspective, the civilian 
opposition perspective becomes a legitimating factor for the international community’s 
response. While Obama makes use of the word “responsibility” in his address, the 
context differs from RtoP’s original intention. Responsibility in RtoP refers to the 
responsibility of the international community to take action when a state fails its people; 
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responsibility in this context refers to the willingness to act in favor of well-established 
norms that correspond with American interests.  
In a piece that demonstrates the conflicting understandings of international 
involvement in a humanitarian crisis, the executives of the U.S., the U.K. and France 
united in an op-ed explaining their involvement in Libya in April 2011. While the authors 
assert that their duty is “to protect civilians . . . It is not to remove Qaddafi by force,”267 
they continue on to say that “it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi 
in power.”268 Such a statement risks affirming fears that RtoP is a regime change 
mechanism. Libya’s path to peace, as asserted by Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy, begins 
with the end of violence against civilians and ends with a “genuine transition from 
dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process.”269 Within the U.S., the support of 
groups like the Foreign Policy Initiative lends credence to the fears of regime change. 
These heads of state pronounce their eagerness to remove an abusive leader under this 
now-possible justification of human protection.  
In order to get a clearer understanding of the RtoP’s impact on the language and 
framing of the Libyan crisis, I would like to return to some of the statements from 
President Clinton concerning the role of the United States in Bosnia. Where President 
Obama insists, “We have a responsibility to act,”270 President Clinton holds that “the 
United States has done what it could to mobilize the forces of NATO.”271 While 
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President Obama lists the crimes of Qaddafi—targeting civilians, attacking hospitals, 
abusing journalists, cutting off food and water272—President Clinton places all the parties 
to the conflict in Bosnia on the same level and gives them the same responsibility to 
“reach an agreement that they can live with and honor.”273 Instead of a sense that outside 
actors should only provide peripheral support for the peace process, NATO states and the 
Security Council insist upon a proactive response for the greater good. As seen with the 
American position during much of the war in the former Yugoslavia, a deference to state 
sovereignty and internal control does not ensure the protection of human lives. A more 
forceful involvement on the part of the Obama administration indicates a higher 
prioritization of human life rather than a perpetual consternation over the violation of 
sovereignty.    
UN Resolutions    
 
 In the UN Security Council Resolutions related to the intervention in Libya, a few 
framing cues communicate a perceptible shift in the understanding of the both the role of 
the state and of the international community. Firstly, UNSCR 1970, from February 26, 
2011, serves as a warning to the Qaddafi regime that its actions will not be tolerated. It 
calls for the urgent inquiry into human rights violations in the country, suggesting that 
such attacks against civilians “may amount to crimes against humanity.”274 UNSCR 1970 
points out the international impact of the crisis in Libya in terms of the destabilizing 
effect of large amounts of refugees.  The document makes use of RtoP language by 
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“[r]ecalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population.”275 By 
indicating the initial responsibility of the state to ensure the safety of its people, the 
Security Council references the entirety of RtoP, though it makes no further claim about 
the responsibility of other states to become involved. There is a recommendation that 
member states assist foreign nationals who wish to leave and a request that “all Member 
States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General . . . 
facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available 
humanitarian and related assistance.”276 The Council does take some concrete steps with 
this resolution; it imposes an asset freeze and travel ban for key members of the regime as 
well as an arms embargo.  
 A few weeks later, on March 17, 2011, the Council released Resolution 1973, 
allowing for robust international action to stem the crisis. Again, the Council refers to 
RtoP, by “Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan 
population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility 
to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.”277 Because of the impact on 
other countries, “the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security.”278 While excluding a foreign occupation, 
UNSCR 1973 requests civilian protection through “all necessary measures.”  This text 
makes clear the importance of regional partners by pointing to Libya’s condemnation by 
the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, as justification for UN action. What’s most important in this document, 
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however, is the emphasis on human rights law. The UN is not taking this action solely 
because of the impact of a refugee spillover—the repeated motif throughout the text is 
civilian protection. Human rights law and international humanitarian law take greater 
precedent here than any other concern. 
 As compared with the previously analyzed resolutions from the Bosnian war era, 
we see a much more forceful sentiment from the Security Council. Instead of merely 
expressing concern at the plight of Libyans in Benghazi, the Security Council states that 
the Qaddafi regime may be committing crimes against humanity. Such an assertion 
establishes definitively the gravity of the situation and positions the Council for an 
immediate reaction in correspondence with RtoP (the UN applies RtoP to four types of 
crimes—crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide). The 
protection of international peace and security was present in the Bosnian resolutions and 
re-appears with Libya in the form of concerns over the massive influx of refugees in 
neighboring states. International security is not the sole reason for Security Council 
involvement, however. The conditional sovereignty communicated by RtoP informs these 
resolutions—Qaddafi’s targeting of his population renders his authority null and void. 
The sense of urgency, the emphasis on human protection, and the use of RtoP vocabulary 
all indicate the adoption of RtoP principles within the Security Council. 
Institutional Advancements  
Kofi Annan first posed the question of how to reconcile the inviolable concept of 
state sovereignty with situations seen in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and current 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has gone to great lengths to implement the concept. 
These institutional advancements helped to solidify RtoP as an emerging doctrine. Ban’s 
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Berlin address on July 15, 2008, begins his campaign for the acceptance of RtoP. By 
choosing to speak on this matter in Berlin, Ban hoped to draw parallels between the 
“irresponsible sovereignty” of Nazi Germany with the contemporary debate.279 Ban 
appointed Edward Luck that year to serve as Special Adviser on the Responsibility to 
Protect, with the goal of fleshing out the two paragraphs on RtoP featured in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document. His report, “Implementing the responsibility to 
protect,” focuses on the protection responsibilities of the state, international assistance 
and capacity-building, and timely and decisive response. The report makes a variety of 
recommendations, including stressing prevention as the most important aspect of RtoP, 
strengthening the International Criminal Court, promoting development, and increased 
consistency from the Secretary-General and Member States.280 Luck’s report goes a long 
way in providing the international community with an RtoP toolbox with which to 
implement preventive measures, react to situations of large-scale human rights violations, 
and help societies move forward after such an event. His suggestions, however, are not 
mandates and cannot be implemented without political will.  
The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, working in 
conjunction with the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, was quickly active 
in the Libyan crisis. Francis Deng, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 
and Edward Luck issued a statement of alarm on February 22, 2011, in which they use 
the phrase “crimes against humanity” to describe the attacks against civilians. They warn 
that if reports of these events prove to be accurate, that “national authorities should be 
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held accountable.”281 Deng and Luck’s role is obviously to advance the RtoP agenda, but 
the high profile of their joint office and their quick reaction to hostilities in Libya 
demonstrate the seriousness with which the UN is treating RtoP. Needless to say, no 
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect existed during the wars of the former 
Yugoslavia, and no Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was in place either. In 
fact, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was not formally established 
until 1992, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali became Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.282 The debacle that was humanitarian intervention in the 1990s prompted the 
Secretary-General to order a study of peacekeeping operations. Known informally as the 
“Brahimi Report,” the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
suggested many reforms to improve institutional responsiveness to atrocity, and it 
appears that much of the advice was heeded.283 While this project will not go into detail 
on the Brahimi Report, it is important to note the organization’s internal reforms helped 
support the emergence of RtoP and expand beyond the traditional peacekeeping 
paradigm.  
Operations 
 
International involvement in Libya very quickly turned to military means. Before 
military operations began, humanitarian groups and coalitions attempted to reach the 
civilians of Libya. On March 12, the Arab League released its decision on the events in 
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Libya. In addition to the call for a no-fly zone, the League also called on its Member 
States and all allies and international organizations to “provide support and urgent 
humanitarian assistant to the Libyan people.”284 The Arab League held a humanitarian 
coordination meeting on the matter on March 16 with equal representation from 
multilateral systems, western NGOs, Islamic INGOs, and Egyptian and Libyan NGOs,285 
demonstrating local involvement and support for humanitarian aid in Libya. A second 
meeting in May resulted in a collaborative aid convoy with 20 agencies from Egypt, 
Libya, and the UK participating. The Libyan NTC joined in, as well, calling for increased 
aid and support for humanitarian actors.286 This conference implies a regional ownership 
of the crisis, as seen when The Humanitarian Forum’s president Dr. Hany El Banna 
concluded the meeting by saying “‘The OIC [Organisation of Islamic Cooperation] and 
LAS [League of Arab States] are the real forces that will lead the Arab organisations to 
save civilians in Libya.’”287 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos “called for an immediate temporary 
cessation of hostilities to allow access for humanitarian assistance, on 8 April.”288 Many 
humanitarian efforts were directed at evacuating Third Country Nationals (TNCs)—about 
10,000 people from other states resided in Misrata alone, frequently there in the capacity 
                                                
284“The implications on the current events in Libya on the Arab position,” League of Arab States, 12 Mar. 
2011, 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20statement%2012%20march
%202011%20-%20english(1).pdf  (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
285 “League of Arab States and The Humanitarian Forum Conference for Libya,” AlertNet.  
286 The implications on the current events in Libya on the Arab position,” League of Arab States.  
287  Ibid. 
288 “Humanitarian Overview—Misrata,” OCHA, 
http://northafrica.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/default/files/110414_OCHA_Misrata_Factsheet.pdf 
(accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
   98 
of temporary laborers.289 According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, in mid-April the International Organization for Migration delivered 400 tons of 
aid and evacuated 800 people; MSF evacuated 135 individuals to Tunisia.290 
The effort to protect civilian lives in Libya quickly became a military coalition 
effort with little division between the United Nations, NATO, and individual states 
(Canada, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates).291 The 
intervention in Libya began as Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD) on March 19, 2011, 
following the Security Council’s passage of Resolution 1973. OOD was led by the United 
States and supported militarily by the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada. Its 
main strategy was to take out Libya’s integrated air and missile defense systems through 
the use of cruise missiles and electronic attacks.292 OOD purpose was to implement a no-
fly zone over Libya in accordance with UNSCR 1973, halting the violence against 
civilians, and bring the crisis to a close.293 The U.S. led the initial charge but soon 
relinquished control to NATO. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “During 
the first phase of Operation Odyssey Dawn, U.S. forces provided the bulk of military 
assets and firepower, logistical support and overall command and control . . . The U.S. 
focus as the operation continues will be electronic attack, aerial refueling, lift, search and 
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rescue, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support,”294 with a persistent 
emphasis that no American troops would have “boots on the ground.”  
 NATO had been involved in Libya since the passage of UNSCR 1970. The 
Alliance increased its surveillance efforts and deployed ships to Mediterranean Sea as a 
precautionary measure. With UNSCR 1973, the Alliance expanded its role, working to 
enforce the arms embargo put in place by the Security Council and assisting with 
enforcement of the no-fly zone.295 On March 31, 2011, NATO assumed control, 
launching Operation Unified Protector (OUP). This mission had three main components: 
(1) enforcement of arms embargo; (2) enforcement of the no-fly zone to prevent the 
bombing of civilian targets; (3) Air and naval strikes against Libyan military forces that 
target or threaten civilians and civilian populated areas.296 OUP continued until October 
31, 2011—11 days after Qaddafi’s capture and death by Libyan rebels. NATO’s 
operation, in total, destroyed about 6,000 Libyan military targets.297  
 The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established to 
assist in the transition out of war. Its mandate is to assist Libya in defining a rebuilding 
strategy, manage the democratic transition process, promote the rule of law and human 
rights standards, restore public security, counter illicit arms proliferation, and coordinate 
humanitarian assistance. 298 15 UN agencies currently operate in Libya,299 indicating that 
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the international community will continue to be involved in Libya’s rebuilding for the 
foreseeable future.  
As clear from this case study, the uncertainty surrounding the roles of the 
institutions during the war in the former Yugoslavia has diminished significantly. Instead 
of competing with each other as they did during that conflict, NATO and the UN worked 
in tandem to advance Security Council Resolution 1973’s goals. The relative efficiency 
of the coordinated efforts between the UN and NATO left both institutions with relatively 
unscathed reputations. The “gentleman’s agreement,” Security Council members 
abstaining from a vote rather than using their veto power, seems to have worked, with 
Russia and China allowing the Security Council to advance with their resolutions.    
Internal divisions inside the EU occurred, with (as seen in the case of Germany) 
many of their members loathe to participate in the military action. The lack of a cohesive 
response from EU countries demonstrates the difficult of forging a common foreign 
policy among the 27 countries. American involvement in this crisis, too, differed sharply 
from the foreign policy actions of the previous decade. Widespread hope that President 
Obama would pursue a more collaborative international agenda was met with this 
operation. U.S. military might, while present and of extreme value to the operation, led 
from behind and allowed the NATO Alliance to command. OUP/OOD should be viewed 
as consistent with Obama’s assertions that “a post-Bush United States would not rush to 
intervene unilaterally in crises, would seek to mobilise the international community, 
would partner with regional actors and would prioritise multilateralism.”300 NATO’s 
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OUP was “portrayed as an objectively non-American command structure” 301 supporting 
an image of a less controlling and imperialistic U.S. 
Though the intervention rapidly took off, internal division persisted throughout 
EU member states. Few countries agreed on the enactment of a no-fly zone, and EU 
leadership declined to make a forceful stance. High Representative Catherine Ashton  
was effectively silent while she sought to define what amounted to the lowest 
political common denominator among member states. Thus, while European 
leaders were making many proposals for action, she was among the last to call for 
sanctions, to make a statement that Gadhafi should go, to make contact with the 
Benghazi-based Transitional National Committee and to support military 
action.302  
 
Italy’s trade partnership with Libya made them reluctant initially to participate in any 
military action, while the UK’s David Cameron was the first European head-of-state to 
call for a no-fly zone. In the end, 10 of 21 EU member states also belonging to NATO 
contributed to the mission. Six countries in total participated in air strikes (the UK, 
France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark and Norway) and some other states (The 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Greece, Sweden, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates) could only engage in air-air combat.303 This lack of universality may be an 
insurmountable challenge, since some measure of reticence toward intervening militarily 
will always exist.  
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Analysis of operations 
 
It is clear that the international community successfully harnessed the language of 
RtoP in the case of Libya in an effort to stem the violence inflicted upon the civilian 
population; what is less clear is the operation’s adherence to the broader principles of 
RtoP. In this section, I will analyze the application of RtoP in Libya, with an eye toward 
changes in policy and practice.  
A highly collaborative project that took great pains to involve other countries 
besides the United States, Operation Odyssey Dawn/United Protector had widespread 
support and was legal because of the UN Security Council’s support. In Resolution 1973, 
the Security Council explicitly applies the responsibility to protect as a justification for 
military action in Libya, but avoids mention of the responsibility to prevent or rebuild 
that are central components within the original concept. Instead, the text underscores the 
“responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and [reaffirms] 
that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to 
ensure the protection of civilians.”304 Western powers widely view the intervention in 
Libya as a successful humanitarian operation, but some of its characteristics indicate that 
civilian protection was not consistently the primary goal. While some attributes of the 
military operation in Libya match RtoP ideals and values, criticism of the Libyan 
operation runs deep and tends to fall along three categories: the executed mission far 
exceeded the stated mandate, there was a lack of international support particularly among 
Arab states, and the international community made little effort at upholding the 
responsibility to prevent. The most salient of these three points is the first one—the 
question of mandate. The ICISS expressly dissuaded any use of RtoP for the purposes of 
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regime change, but regime change is what happened in Libya despite of statements to the 
contrary. This section of the paper will investigate these criticisms. 
Regime Change  
First, let us examine the critique of regime change, both in its actualization in 
Libya and its absence in RtoP. Though the actors deny the presence of regime change, I 
argue that it informed their operations and was, in fact, necessary for the ultimate goal of 
civilian protection. NATO’s three main goals for Operation Unified Protector—enforcing 
the arms embargo and the no-fly zone and eliminating the threat to civilians from the 
Libyan military—indicate that human protection was to be achieved through the 
weakening of the government and its related branches (like the military). Instead of 
creating safe zones, as seen in the Bosnian war, international forces conducted a 
proactive strike against potential aggressors. Operation Unified Protector was not limited 
to Benghazi, the city at the origin of the uprising, but sought out military targets 
throughout the country. In this sense, the intervention had at its core, the goal of 
weakening the Qaddafi regime in order to protect the citizens of Libya. As the 
preservation of human life was the stated goal of this mission, the question becomes not 
whether regime change was part of the unstated mission goals, but whether regime 
change should be part of the Responsibility to Protect as a whole. As the Global Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect stated,  
there is no doubt countries that were actively supporting the Libyan intervention 
stretched their interpretation of Resolution 1973 regarding ‘all necessary 
measures’ to its limit. But, on the other hand, questions regarding protection of 
civilian cannot neglect political and military realities. Given the well-founded fear 
that if Qaddafi were to regain control of rebel-held territory he would perpetrate 
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further mass atrocities, assisting the rebels in preventing him from doing so was, 
arguably, a legitimate part of the protection mandate.305 
 
A long-term solution would have been all but impossible without the removal of Qaddafi, 
and it was clear from his statements that he would be unwilling to negotiate with the 
rebels. Ultimately, regime change ensured the survival of thousands of Libyan civilians. 
For David Rieff, RtoP’s refusal to accept or promote regime change as a viable 
strategy for the preservation of human rights and life represents a significant structural 
failing. Rieff, as we know from his outspoken criticisms of states’ inaction during crises 
of epic proportions, generally approves of humanitarian interventions. Yet, he predicted 
the death of RtoP following the Libya intervention. Due to RtoP’s insistence that it not 
include regime change, the norm, Rieff argues, is fundamentally incapable of effecting 
real change. The idea’s proponents have ignored the fact that “in the midst of rebellions 
such as the one in Libya, people cannot be protected without regime change.”306 Without 
acknowledging the need for regime change, RtoP is simply a re-packaging of previous 
humanitarian intervention models, such as the one seen in Kosovo. RtoP, in its basic 
form, differed from the humanitarian intervention model because of its continuum of 
action—prevention, reaction, rebuilding—but, according to Rieff, the Libya operation 
adheres more closely to the previous model. The mission, he states, “puts the old wine of 
Kosovo-style intervention in a new U.N.-sanctioned bottle.”307  
The protection of Benghazi, central to the mandate, did not also include the 
authorization of air support during the continuing battle. Because the mission expanded 
beyond simply providing a safe haven for the civilians of Benghazi, Rieff argues that it 
                                                
305 Dr. Simon Adams, “Libya and R2P Occasional Paper,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
(2012), 13. 
306 David Rieff, “R2P, R.I.P.”  
307 Ibid. 
   105 
has broken with RtoP (a flawed concept to begin with). That is not to say, however, that 
Rieff disagreed with intervening—he simply finds the RtoP justification dishonest and 
ultimately self-destructing. A non-RtoP mission aimed at the removal of Qaddafi, Rieff 
suggests, would be a more productive means of going about the cessation of atrocity.  
The inability to articulate that regime change’s necessity put the mission in an 
awkward position: it could not discuss reasons why regime change was necessary for that 
case, thereby calming the fears of proponents of a traditional state sovereignty or 
developing states. Instead, these criticisms of an overly expansive, stretched mandate 
have not received proper responses. That lack of clarity led Michael Walzer, an early 
proponent of humanitarian interventions, to question the implementation of RtoP in 
Libya. Primarily, he sees little clarity in terms of mission purpose and endgame.308 As 
written, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 does not indicate whether the international 
coalition have been satisfied only once Qaddafi had been removed from power, or 
whether establishing a safe environment for civilians for a certain period of time would 
have satisfied the coalition. For the Arab League and the African Union, the stretching of 
Resolution 1973, only clear after the operation began, was unacceptable and proved a 
threat to their own sovereign status.  In a criticism that seems highly unrealistic given the 
political environment at the time, Walzer comments that Egypt and Tunisia would have 
been essential participants in a legitimate humanitarian intervention in Libya. Walzer 
notes that the Arab League, which had originally supported the creation of a no-fly zone, 
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is “already criticizing the attacks required to make it work.”309 Russia’s foreign minister, 
additionally, criticized the effort, saying, “‘We think that intervention by the coalition in 
what is essentially a civil war has not been sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council 
resolution.’”310  
Walzer’s critique reflects an adherence to the original philosophy of RtoP: “the 
overthrow of tyrants and the establishment of democracy has to be local work, and in this 
case, sadly, the locals couldn’t do it.”311 While he acknowledges that there would have 
been a swift reaction from Qaddafi’s government against the protesters and rebels, he 
argues that the international community could have acted in other ways to limit the death 
toll (helping rebels escape the country, for example). Finally, Walzer writes that a 
military operation of this sort would have been acceptable in a situation like that of 
Rwanda or Darfur, but not in Libya.312 Walzer’s writings indicate that he would have 
preferred a standing policy of prevention with intervention only possible for strict human 
protection purposes (a view consistent with his early work). If the international 
community were to heed that critique and leave regime change to local actors, one can 
imagine that a very different scenario would be playing out in Libya.  
 Sustaining that critique, the international community transferred sovereignty to the 
rebel groups after a few months of fighting. Endorsement of the rebel groups as 
legitimate political leaders occurred, in large part, due to the involvement of French 
philosopher and public figure, Bernard-Henri Lévy. Present at a meeting of the Libyan 
rebels in Benghazi in the midst of fighting, Lévy sympathized with their plight and 
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offered to connect the groups with the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. They accepted 
the offer, and “began making demands about official recognition. More phone calls to 
Sarkozy followed. The demands were met and the French president launched himself into 
getting European and UN approval for military action against Gaddafi.”313 This 
haphazard validation of the rebel armies and their leaders represents a shift in action for 
the operation. At that point, removing Qadhafi from power became the primary goal and 
took precedence over stabilizing the country for the safety of its population.  
Questions of Prevention 
Another criticism of the intervention in Libya was its hasty escalation into a 
military operation, introducing the question of preventative measures. The ICISS 
expressed strong views about the importance of prevention over reaction or rebuilding 
(“Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect”314), 
but evidence of preventive action remains elusive. The timeline of the intervention in 
Libya differs significantly from that of the war in Bosnia. While the international 
community was, for years, wringing its hands over sovereignty issues and an 
unwillingness to risk their own troops for the good of the Balkan states, the turnaround 
time from Qaddafi’s first threats until the passage of Security Council Resolution 1973 
allowing for air strikes and a no-fly zone was little over a month. To be sure, a lack of 
swift action in Bosnia contributed to the high body count. A swift response, I argue, 
aligns with RtoP’s intentions more closely than prolonged negotiations with an 
unresponsive regime.   
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Margaret O’Brien Steinfels expresses reservations about the motivations of the 
U.S. in Operation Odyssey Dawn, focusing on the limited period of inquiry prior to the 
launching of an international campaign. She writes that “calls for humanitarian 
intervention in Libya required only the threats of a madman, the ardent pleas of the 
rebels, and the cooperation of the Arab League,”315 in contrast to cases like Rwanda and 
Bosnia where little action was taken very late in the game. She points out the moral 
hazard of interventions, arguing that they can foster rebellion by lowering the potential 
cost to the rebels who believe that they will be aided by other powerful states.316 Steinfels 
asserts that the President’s decision to engage in Libya is more based on practicalities 
than on moral values:  
Why did President Barack Obama finally agree? Consider the following: (1) 
pressure from advisers who feared another Rwanda; (2) a quid pro quo for British 
and French support in Iraq and Afghanistan; (3) a promise to the Pentagon of ‘no 
boots on the ground’ to quiet military objections; (4) an opportunity to support 
multilateralism in  
which the United States did not have to take the lead; (5) everyone hates 
Qaddafi.317 
 
Peer pressure combined with little cost to the U.S.’s reputation allowed President Obama 
to join the effort without engaging in any real diplomatic measures.  
Steinfels seemingly would have preferred a longer period of waiting or tangible 
evidence of a massacre before international intervention, a viewpoint that brings to the 
forefront an ongoing debate on RtoP’s purpose and utility. While Steinfels’s argument 
disregards the historical impetus to react quickly in the face of impending massacres, her 
critique links to the inherent problems of preventative action within RtoP itself. This 
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project has not dealt extensively with questions of prevention, though the ICISS held it 
up as the most critical aspect of RtoP. A central debate concerning RtoP and its 
operationalization is how to approach preventive action while still allowing for the ability 
to intervene. The ensuing lack of clarity is in part due to the identity crisis present within 
RtoP itself.  Returning to the debate between Bellamy and Weiss mentioned at the very 
beginning of this paper, one must consider the ultimate goal of RtoP. Is the concept 
meant to put in place a standing commitment to the prevention of atrocity, or is it most 
effective as a rallying cry to motivate other states into action? These two competing 
conceptions lead to two very different conclusions about the operation in Libya. If you 
prefer RtoP as a policy of preventive action and early warning, then RtoP failed due to its 
quick descent into military action, its endorsement of a new leading group, and its tacit 
approval of the execution of the head of state. However, if RtoP is more logically situated 
as a rhetorical tool to garner support and force action, then it may have made the 
transition from concept to doctrine with Libya.  Herein lies the ultimate question about 
the long-term viability of RtoP.  
Bellamy’s 2010 re-examination of RtoP investigates these two conflicting 
agendas among the doctrine’s proponents and ultimately settles on the need for a long-
term policy agenda of prevention.  The two concepts cannot coexist—if RtoP catalyzes 
an international response to a crisis, it cannot also represent a sustained commitment to 
genocide prevention.318 Bellamy’s interpretation holds the possibility of creating 
sustained change through a greater effort at early-warning systems and diplomacy. The 
result, paradoxically, would be the disappearance of the RtoP idea in international 
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dialogue. Bellamy advances a version of RtoP that would eliminate the need for the 
responsibility to react or the responsibility to rebuild. If Bellamy’s RtoP were to succeed, 
there would be no discussion of RtoP except within the halls of the UN.  
Conversely, Weiss maintains that RtoP should be reserved as a means to spur 
states into action, so as to avoid the dilution of the concept. Eli Stamnes summarizes that 
perspective, saying that the “intention behind the RtoP principle is to generate a speech 
act . . . which has the effect of elevating certain issues above normal politics as a catalyst 
for decisive action.”319 From this angle, RtoP would be used as it was in Libya: a 
vocabulary system designed to convey a sense of urgency and solemnity. This strategy 
appears to have succeeded in Libya, with many states coming together to protect civilian 
lives over a matter of a few months. Weiss says that a successful campaign in Libya “will 
put teeth in the fledgling RtoP doctrine” 320 because it demonstrates that the UN can 
follow through on its threat of reaction. Because of the international response, abusers of 
power like Qaddafi will take more seriously the guidance of the United Nations. 
Prevention of atrocity through development, education, improved monitoring, and 
cooperative efforts between governments, remains critical to a diminished body count 
worldwide, but the credibility of these diplomatic efforts depends on a readiness to use 
military force. Without the threat of armed intervention in Libya, the other measures (like 
the arms embargo and asset freeze) would have been much more difficult decisions. 321 
The UN World Summit Outcome document which endorsed RtoP in 2005 says little 
about armed humanitarian intervention, but instead mentions the use of “appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations 
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from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”322 As Weiss 
points out, “armed force was absent from the international RtoP agenda until Libya.”323 
Without the ability to use armed force in these humanitarian crises, or at least a credible 
threat of force, protection is unlikely and conflict will endure.324  With this strengthened 
version of RtoP, Weiss suggests that we can use the rhetoric of ‘never again’ and 
“occasionally mean it.”325  
The inability to assign straightforward and predictable roles to the international 
community seems to be an insurmountable problem for the continued strength of RtoP. 
The doctrine’s innovation can be located in its insistence on the obligation of all states to 
“assist and encourage their peers in the fulfillment of their RtoP . . . and third, “take 
timely and decisive action in cases where a state has manifestly failed in its RtoP,”326 
however, the roles assigned to all states when dealing with crises in other states, remain 
highly unclear. If RtoP is a catalyzing speech act, the division of labor will need to be re-
hashed and doled out at the commencement of each new case of mass atrocity, slowing 
down response time and inviting questions of political agendas. Treating RtoP as a policy 
agenda, however, would remain true to the ICISS’s vision for the doctrine—focused on 
prevention efforts. As prevention becomes more successful, “the more difficult it is to 
demonstrate RtoP’s impact; yet this is where the principle might have its greatest effect if 
it succeeds in galvanizing efforts to strengthen early warning, build preventive capacity, 
and minimize root causes.”327 If this were to succeed, the proof would be in the decrease 
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of mass atrocity events.328  
While the ICISS’s version of RtoP focuses on prevention as the most essential 
element, it was not central to international involvement in Libya in 2011. The effect of a 
quick and decisive intervention on the doctrine of RtoP is unclear. Weiss points out that 
emphasizing the prevention of genocide, as the ICISS did in their initial document, was 
“politically correct but counterproductive.”329 The trifecta of action—prevention, 
reaction, rebuilding—made more palatable the option of military intervention, 
particularly for states fearing threats to their sovereignty. After all, the addition of the 
first and last elements marked a departure from the murky waters of humanitarian 
intervention. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
While deciphering the appropriate response to atrocity will likely be debated 
anew at each instance of atrocity, the Responsibility to Protect has shifted the 
international community’s expectations for individual states and for themselves as a 
collective. In this thesis, I have discussed two examples of armed humanitarian 
intervention in response to large-scale human rights violations—one before and one after 
the emergence of RtoP. I structured the cases of both Bosnia and Libya to give insight 
into three issues: the language and framing used to engage with these events, the 
engagement by international organizations, and the ensuing operations. By choosing 
these three foci, I intended to assess whether, firstly, a change in the language with which 
we discuss these types of atrocities had occurred, and whether that change resulted in 
different policy at the domestic level and for international organizations like NATO and 
the UN. In sum, did the Responsibility to Protect have an impact on the response to 
atrocity? By examining two instances of international intervention, we can determine a 
clear influence of RtoP in the case of Libya, though it remains difficult to extrapolate that 
case into an all-encompassing prediction. 
My thesis has demonstrated a discernable transformation in the framing of these 
large-scale atrocity events and in the reaction from states and international organizations, 
but it also brings to light new problems in the application of RtoP. As demonstrated 
throughout my exploration of humanitarian intervention, actors have accepted, relatively 
quickly, the prioritization of human rights over state sovereignty. Taking the United 
States as an example, the hesitancy to involve American troops with the war in Bosnia 
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displayed by President Clinton was nearly nonexistent in the case of Libya and the 
Obama administration. One can hope that, disregarding RtoP, the problems of the languid 
reaction in Bosnia would have influenced contemporary leaders and prompted a more 
active response, but the codification of RtoP solidified an international (though not 
universal) commitment to mitigating large-scale human rights violations. Similarly, 
world leaders seem to express a greater sense of obligation to mitigate conflict in cases of 
atrocity in accordance with RtoP’s new understanding of sovereignty.  
While humanitarian intervention has a vibrant and broad literature, the addition of 
Libya to the list of humanitarian intervention cases prompts new exploration of this topic. 
With Libya, we saw a fortified and determined UN Security Council call for prompt 
action and garner support from regional organizations, and we saw NATO respond with 
an effective military campaign. A few questions arise from this version of humanitarian 
intervention. The fear of a new imperialism has not been assuaged with RtoP and 
criticisms of regime change in Libya threaten to discredit the concept. Initial support 
from the Arab League waned when it became clear that NATO would not strictly limit its 
campaign to civilian protection within Benghazi. Admitting that the removal of Qaddafi 
was an objective from outset may have gone a long way in gaining the trust of all 
Member States. 
The critique of regime change brings us to some internal conflicts within RtoP in 
need of further exploration and research. Despite ICISS insistence that regime change be 
excluded from the RtoP umbrella, it is hard to imagine a military reaction to a tyrant that 
did not conclude with some sort of transition in state leadership. The uncertainty over the 
ultimate role of RtoP, whether to emphasize prevention or reserve RtoP for rallying a 
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robust response to atrocity, will prevent the emerging doctrine from being fully 
incorporated into the practices of the international community. The ICISS may have 
insisted upon a trifecta of action to protect civilian populations, but the implementation of 
a full-scale prevention or early-warning system carries its own concerns. Practitioners 
and academics will have to weigh the feasibility of those two conflicting interpretations 
of RtoP. While the interpretation of RtoP as a long-term prevention plan may be more in 
line with the ICISS’s report, prevention may stretch sovereignty beyond its breaking 
point. In order for RtoP to succeed in further interventions, practitioners will need to 
decide where to focus their efforts—either in prevention or in reaction—and adjust 
political expectations accordingly.  
   
   116 
Works Cited 
“2010 Human Rights Report: Libya.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 8 
 Apr. 2011.  
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154467.htm (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
Abbas, Mohammed. “Gaddafi pummels rebels as war outpaces diplomacy.” Reuters. 16 
 Mar. 2011.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110316 
 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Adams, Simon. “Libya and R2P Occasional Paper.” Global Centre for the Responsibility 
 to Protect (2012). 
 
Adebajo, Adekeye. “Gaddafi: the man who would be king of Africa.” The Guardian, 26 
 Aug. 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/26/gaddafi-legacy-meddling-
africa  (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Adelman, Howard. “Rwanda revisited: in search for lessons.” Journal of Genocide 
 Research 2, no. 3 (2000). 
 
African Union. Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. Jul. 2002.
 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d1da8752.html (accessed 23 March 2013). 
 
Annan, Kofi A. “‘We The Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.” 
 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information: 2000). 
 http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm (accessed 12 Nov. 2012).  
 
Asumah, Seth. “Islam, Rentier States and The Quest for Democracy in Africa.” Western 
 Journal of Black Studies 34, no. 4 (2010). 
 
Barschdorff, Peter. “Can NATO Deliver?” SAIS Review 18, no .2 (1998). 
 
“Battle for Libya: Key Moments.” Al Jazeera. 19 Nov. 2011. 
 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/2011102010424470676
 0.html  (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Bell, Martin. “Sarajevo: Another market massacre.” BBC News. 4 Apr. 2012.
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17402772 (accessed 23 Mar. 2012). 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds 
 (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
 
   117 
Bellamy, Alex J. “Motives, Outcomes, Intent, and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian 
 Intervention. Journal of Military Ethics 3, no. 3 (2004). 
 
Bellamy, Alex J.  “The Responsibility to Protect-Five Years On.” Ethics & International 
 Affairs  24, no. 2 (2010). 
 
Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. "The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, 
 Libya and the responsibility to protect." International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 
 825-850. (accessed February 5, 2013). 
 
Bertsch, Gary K. “Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia,” The Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science 433, no. 1 (1977). 
 
Bowen, N. “The Future of UN Peacekeeping.” International journal on World Peace xiv, 
 no. 2 (1997). 
 
“Burma-Cyclone Nargis.” French Embassy in London. 25 May 2008. 
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Bernard-Kouchner-on-Burma-disaster.html  
(accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
Burns, John F.  “Hemming and Hawing, Bosnia Serbs Back Peace Plan.” New York 
 Times. 21 Jan. 1993. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/21/world/hemming-and-hawing-bosnia-serbs-
 back-peace-plan.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013). 
 
Bonner, Raymond. “Bosnian Serb Leader Signals Acceptance of Peace Plan.” New York 
 Times.  25 Nov. 1995. 
 
“Bosnia-Hercegovina timeline.” BBC News. 12 Jan. 2012.     
  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1066981.stm (accessed 11 
 Nov. 2012).   
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. “Empowering the United Nations.” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 
 (1992). 
 
Burns, John F. “Bosnian Troops Fail to Break Serbs’ Tight Siege of Sarajevo.” New York 
 Times.  1 Aug. 1992.  
 
Cassin, Rene. Free World. “The United Nations and Human Rights.”
 http://www.unz.org/Pub/FreeWorld-1946sep-00016 (accessed 12 Jan. 2013).  
 
Jacques Chirac. “Conférence de presse.”14 Jul. 1995. 
 http://www.veronis.fr/discours/transcript/1995-07-14/Chirac (accessed 17 Nov. 
 2012).  
 
Christopher, Warren. “Bosnia—We Must be the Leaders of Peace.” Vital Speeches of the 
   118 
 Day 62, no. 5 (1995). 
 
“Chronology: The US/UN in Somalia.” Ambush in Mogadishu. PBS.
 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/cron.html (accessed 
 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Chulov, Martin. “Libyan city dubbed ‘Free Benghazi’ as anti-Gaddafi troops take 
control.” The  Guardian. 23 Feb. 2011.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/23/libya-free-benghazi-anti-gaddafi-
 troops  (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25).” 
 Bureau of International Organizational Affairs. U.S. Department of State. 22 Feb. 
 1996. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Clinton, William J. "Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on Bosnia." 6 Feb. 1994. 
 The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49354 (accessed 23 Mar. 2013). 
 
Clinton, William J. "Remarks Announcing the NATO Decision on Air Strikes in Bosnia 
 and an  Exchange With Reporters." 9 Feb. 1994. The American Presidency 
 Project.
 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49509&st=&st1=  
(accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Clinton, William J. "Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With 
 President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia." 8 Sep. 1993. The American Presidency 
 Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47045 (accessed 23 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
Cohen, Roger. “Ethnic Cleansing.” Crimes of War. 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/ethnic-cleansing/ (accessed 31 Mar. 2013). 
 
Cooper, Helene, and Steven Lee Myers. “Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift 
 by Clinton.” The New York Times. 18 Mar. 2011. 
 
Darton, John. “Conflict in the Balkans; Serbs Again Reject Vance-Owen Peace 
 Proposals.” The New York Times, 25 Apr. 1993. 
 
Daalder, Ivo H. “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended.” Dec. 1998, 
 http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder (accessed 23 
 Mar. 2013).  
 
Davenport, Kelsey. “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United 
 States.” Arms Control Association. Jan. 2013.     
   119 
 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/LibyaChronology (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
de Waal, Alex. “Darfur and the failure of the Responsibility to Protect.” International 
 Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007).  
 
Dempsey, Judy. “Germany Officially Recognizes Libyan Rebel Government.” The New 
 York Times, 13 Jun. 2011.  
 
Deng, Francis, Sadikei Kimaro, Terence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and J. William 
 Zartman. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa 
 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996). 
 
Deni, John R. Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st 
 Century (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007). 
 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/ (accessed 7 Apr. 2013).  
 
“DOD News Briefing with Vice Adm. Gortney from the Pentagon on Libya Operation 
 Odyssey Dawn.” 19 Mar. 2011.  
 http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4786  
(accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
Dominguez-Meyer, Jason. “From paralysis in Rwanda to boldness in Libya: has the 
 international  community taken ‘responsibility to protect’ from abstract principle 
 to concrete norm under international law?” Houston Journal of International 
 Law 34, no. 1 (2011). 
 
Doyle, Michael W. “The Folly of Protection: Is Intervention Against Qaddafi’s Regime 
 Legal and Legitimate?” Foreign Affairs.  20 Mar. 2011.  
 
Dutch, William J., Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan. “The 
 Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations.” The Henry L. Stimson 
 Center. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/BR-
 CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf  (accessed 7 Apr. 2013). 
 
Jason A. Edwards. “Redefining Sovereignty: An Analysis of U.N. Secretary General Ban 
 Ki Moon’s Rhetoric on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine.” Peace and 
 Security 19, no.1 (2012). 
  
“Ethnic Cleansing.” Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding. 
 United  States Institute of Peace.  
http://glossary.usip.org/resource/ethnic-cleansing (accessed 12 Nov. 2012).  
 
   120 
Evans, Gareth. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and 
 For All (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008). 
 
Evans, Gareth. “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons and Challenges.” 
 Alice Tay Lecture on Law and Human Rights. 5 May 2011.
 http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech437.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. "The Responsibility to Protect." Foreign 
 Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002). 
 
Evans, Gareth. "The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and 
 for All." Irish Studies in International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2009). 
 
“Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional National Council.” The Libyan Interim 
 National Council. 5 Mar. 2011.  
http://www.ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-
 national-council/ (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“France, U.K. Have Differing Motives for Intervening in Libya.” Stratfor. 29 Mar. 2011.  
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2011/03/29/france-u-k-have-differing-
 motives-for-intervening-in-libya/  (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“Gaddafi tells Benghazi his army is coming tonight.” Al Arabiya News. 17 Mar. 2011. 
  http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/17/141999.html (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013). 
 
Garamone, Jim. “Coalition Launches ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn.’” American Forces 
 Press Service. 19 Mar. 2011.  
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63225 (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
Gruot, Barthélemy. “Libye: ‘nos forces aériennces s’opposeront à toute aggression des 
 avions du colonel Kadhafi.’” 19 Mar. 2011. 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/libye-nos-forces-aeriennes-s-
 opposeront-a- toute-agression-des-avions-du-colonel-kadhafi (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
Gwin, Peter. “Former Qaddafi Mercenaries Describe Fighting in Libyan War.” The 
 Atlantic. 31 Aug. 2011. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/former-qaddafi-
mercenaries-describe-fighting-in-libyan-war/244356/ (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Hehir, Aidan. “The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?” 
 International Relations 24, no. 218 (2010). 
 
   121 
Henkin, Louis. “Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention.’” The American 
 Journal of International Law 93, no. 4 (1999). 
 
Henri-Levy, Bernard. “Behind the Scenes of France’s Lead on Libya.” New Perspectives 
 Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2011).  
 
Henri-Levy, Bernard. “Sarajevo : Europe’s Final Resting Place.” New Perspectives 
 Quarterly 10,  no. 2 (Spring 1993). 
 
Holbrooke, Richard. “The future of NATO and Europe's changing security 
 landscape.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6, no. 16. 17 Apr. 1995.  
 
Howe, Jonathan T. “The United States and the United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of 
 Involvement.” The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1995).  
 
Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 - Bosnia-Hercegovina. 1 
 Jan. 1994. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca8ab.html (accessed 4 
 November 2012). 
 
“Humanitarian Overview—Misrata.” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
 Affairs. 
 http://northafrica.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/default/files/110414_OCHA_M
 israta_Factsheet.pdf (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
 “Humanitarian efforts continue despite heavy shelling.” Office for the Coordination of 
 Humanitarian Affairs. 18 Apr. 2011.  
http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/libya-humanitarian-efforts-continue-
 despite-heavy-shelling (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
Ignateiff, Michael. “State Failure and Nation-building.” Humanitarian Intervention: 
 Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. 
 Keohane. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
 
Ignatieff, Michael and Amy Gutmann. Human rights as politics and idolatry. Princeton, 
 NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to 
 Protect. (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 
 
“Interview: General Romeo Dallaire.” Ghosts of Rwanda. PBS.    
 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html 
 (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
  
Jaboeuf, Vivien. “French Complicity in the Rwandan Genocide: An Interview with Jean-
 Paul  Gouteux.” World Politics Review. 15 Apr. 2008. 
 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1940/french-complicity-in-the-
   122 
 rwandan-genocide-an-interview-with-jean-paul-gouteux?page=2 (accessed 24 
 Mar. 2013).  
  
“Jus ad bellum.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 28 Jul. 2005. 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2 (accessed 14 Dec. 2012).  
 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Nicholas Sambanis. “Bosnia’s Civil War: Origins and Violence 
 Dynamics.” The World Bank. Jul. 1, 2005.  
 
Karpf, Anne. “France and the Holocaust: A Return of the Repressed.” The Guardian. 5 
 Aug. 2011.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/05/france-holocaust-sarahs-
 key (accessed 8 Apr. 2013). 
 
Kaufman, Michael T. “The Dangers of Letting a President Read.” The New York Times. 
 22 May 1999. 
 
Klarevas, Louis T. “Trends: The United States Peace Operations in Somalia.” The Public 
 Opinion Quarterly 64, no. 4, (2002). 
 
Kouchner, Bernard. Les guerriers de la paix: du Kosovo à l'Irak (Paris : Grasset, 2004). 
 
“Kouchner’s Kingdom; French Foreign Policy.” The Economist. 13 Oct. 2007.   
 
Kraus, Clifford. “The Scramble for Access to Libya’s Oil Wealth Begins.” The New York 
 Times,  22 Aug. 2011. 
 
“League of Arab States and The Humanitarian Forum Conference for Libya.” AlertNet. 
 25 Mar. 2011.  
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/league-of-arab-states-and-the-humanitarian-
forum-conference-for-libya (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Lewis, Anthony. “Abroad at Home; Lord Owen’s Argument.” The New York Times. 5 
 Feb. 1993.  
 
Lewis, Michael. “Obama’s Way.” Vanity Fair. Oct. 2012. 
 
Landler, Mark. “Obama Tells Qaddafi to quit and Authorizes Refugee Airlifts,” The New 
 York Times, 3 Mar. 2011. 
 
Lee, Jesse. “President Obama speaks on the Turmoil in Libya.” The White House. 23 Feb. 
 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaks-
 turmoil-libya- violence-must-stop (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
“Libya: Ban welcomes Security Council authorization of measures to protect civilians.” 
 UN News Centre. 18 Mar. 2011.   
   123 
 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37809&Cr=libya&Cr1#.UJa3W
 ml275k (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.” BBC News. 21 Oct. 2011.   
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12806112 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
  
“Libyan rebels facing tough fight for Sirte.” Al Jazeera. 28 Mar. 2011.  
 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201132681812362552.html 
 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
  
“Libya: Timeline of key events since February 2011.” IRIN. 8 Apr. 2011. 
 http://www.irinnews.org/Report/92410/LIBYA-Timeline-of-key-events-since-
 February-2011 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“Libya: US urges tough United Nations resolution.” BBC News. 17 Mar. 2011. 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-africa-12768695 (accessed 24 Mar.  
 2013). 
 
“Libyans in first Abu Salim jail massacre remembrance.” BBC News. 29 Jun. 2012.
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18641761 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
Luck, Edward. “Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-
 General.” United Nations General Assembly. 12 Jan. 2009. 
 
MacFarlane, S. Neil. “Intervention in Contemporary World Politics.” The Adelphi Papers 
 42 no. 350 (2002). 
 
Matthews, Max W. “Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: 
 The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur.” Boston 
 College International & Comparative Law Review 31, no.1 (2008). 
 
Morton, J.S. "The Legality of NATO's Intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999: Implications 
  for the Progressive Development of International Law." ILSA Journal of 
 International & Comparative Law 9, no. 1 (2002). 
 
“Munich Agreement,” Encyclopedia Brittanica Online, 
 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/397522/Munich-Agreement 
 (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Naimark, Norman. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe 
 (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
“NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo.” NATO. 15 Jul. 1999. 
 http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
   124 
Newman, Michael. Humanitarian intervention: confronting the contradictions (New 
 York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
 
O’Brien Steinfels, Margaret. “Hazardous Means: Libya and the Ambiguity of 
 Humanitarian  Intervention.” Commonweal. 17 Jun. 2011.  
 
Obama, Barack, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy. “Libya’s Pathway to Peace.” 14 
 Apr. 2011.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/14/joint-op-ed-president-
obama-prime-minister-cameron-and-president-sarkozy (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
“Observing the Ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir.” United Nations. 
 Http://www.un.org/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.shtml (accessed 
 23 Mar. 2013). 
 
Orwin, Clifford. "Humanitarian Military Intervention: Wars for the End of History?” 
 Social  Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 1(2006). 
 
Parekh, Bhikhu."Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention." International Political Science 
 Review 18, no. 1 (1997). 
 
Parrish, Karen. “Pentagon Tallies Coaltion Actions in Libya.” American Forces Press 
 Service. 23 Mar. 2011.   
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63269 (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
Parrish, Karen. “Gates Outlines U.S. Role as NATO Takes Libya Mission.” American 
 Forces Press Service. 31 Mar. 2011. 
 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63378 (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013). 
 
“Part 2, Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” United 
 Nations. 12 Jul. 1999. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (accessed 
 20 Jan. 2013).  
 
Perry, William J. “United States Military Objectives.” Vital Speeches of the Day 60, no.  
  12 (1994).  
 
Polgreen, Lydia. "Qaddafi, as New African Union Head, Will Seek Single State." The  
  New York Times. 3 Feb. 2009.  
 
“Post Cold-War surge.” United Nations Peacekeeping.     
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml (accessed 23 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
   125 
“Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya.” National Defense 
 University. 28  Mar. 2011.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president- obama-
 s-speech-libya#transcript (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
Report of the Secretary-General. “Post-conflict Peacebuilding.” An Agenda for Peace, 17 
 Jun. 1992.  
 
Rieff, David. A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon & 
 Schuster, 2003). 
 
Rieff, David. “Humanitarian Intervention.”  
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/humanitarian-intervention/ (accessed 18 
 Jan. 2013).  
 
Rieff, David. “R2P, R.I.P.” The New York Times. 7 Nov. 2011.  
 
Rieff, David. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Simon & 
 Schuster, 1996). 
 
Rohde, David. Endgame (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997). 
 
Sadiki, Larbi. “Wither Arab ‘Republicanism’? The Rise of Family Rule and the ‘End of 
 Democratization’ in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.” Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 1 
 (2010).  
 
“Sarajevo 1992-1995: looking back after 20 years.” BBC News. 9 Apr. 2012.  
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17617775 (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Sanger, David E. and Thom Shanker. “Gates Warns of Risks of a No-Flight Zone.” The 
 New York Times, 2 Mar. 2011. 
 
Sayare, Scott and Alan Cowell. “Libyan Refugee Crisis Called a ‘Logistical Nightmare.’” 
 The New York Times. 3 Mar. 2011.  
 
Schulte, G.L. “Former Yugoslavia and the new NATO.” Survival: Global Politics and 
 Strategy 39, no. 1 (1997).  
 
Sciolino, Elaine. “Clinton rules out a quick response to Bosnia attack.” The New York 
 Times. Feb. 7, 1994. 
 
“Security Council Resolution 743 (1992).” UN Security Council. 21 Feb. 1992. 
 http://www.nato.int/Ifor/un/u920221a.htm (accessed 21 Mar. 2013). 
 
“Security Council Resolution 1004 (1995).” UN Security Council. 12 Jul. 1995. 
 http://www.nato.int/Ifor/un/u950712a.htm (accessed 21 Mar. 2013).   
   126 
 
“Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011).” UN Security Council. 26 Feb. 2011. 
 http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4d6ce9742 
(accessed 24  Mar. 2013).  
 
 “Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011).” UN Security Council. 17 Mar. 2011. 
 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution (accessed 
 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
 Shanker, Thom and Eric Schmitt. “Seeing Limits to War in Libya.” The New York 
 Times. 21 Oct. 2011. 
 
 “Soixante-dix ans après le Vél d’Hiv, cérémonie en mémoire de la Shoah à Paris.” Le 
 Pointe. 9 Sep. 2012.  
http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/soixante-dix-ans-apres-le-vel-d-hiv-ceremonie-en-
 memoire-de-la-shoah-a-paris-09-09-2012-1504228_23.php (accessed 23 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
“Statement on Former Yugoslavia.” NATO. 17 Dec. 1992.     
 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23974.htm (accessed  
 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
“Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Libya Arms Embargo.” NATO. 22 Mar. 
 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71689.htm (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013). 
 
Stone, Brendan. “The U.S.-NATO Military Intervention in Kosovo: Triggering Ethnic 
 Conflict as a pretext for intervention.” Global Research. 29 Dec. 2005.  
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-u-s-nato-military-intervention-in-kosovo/1666 
(accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Strauss, Scott. “Identifying Genocide and Related Forms of Mass Atrocity.” United 
 States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 7 Oct. 2011. 
 http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/pdf/indentifying-genocide.pdf (accessed 3 Jan. 
 2013).  
 
“Talking about Genocide: Bosnia 1995.” Peace Pledge Union Information.  
 http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/g_bosnia.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
Talmon, Stefan. “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council.” American 
 Society of International Law 15, no. 16 (2011). 
 
Tardy, Thierry. “The UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage Against Nature.” Security 
 Dialogue 38, no 1 (2007).  
 
Terry, Fiona. Condemned to Repeat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
   127 
 
“Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia.” BBC News. 22 May 2006.    
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
 “Timeline: Libya sanctions.” BBC News. 15 Oct. 2004.     
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3336423.stm (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
“Timeline-Arab Spring: a year that shook the Arab World.” Reuters. 14 Jan. 2011. 
 http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/tunisia-revolution-anniversary-
 idINDEE80C0IT20120113 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
“The implications on the current events in Libya on the Arab position.” League of Arab 
 States.  12 Mar. 2011. 
 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20sta
 tement %2012%20march%202011%20-%20english(1).pdf  (accessed 24 Mar. 
 2013).  
 
“Tunisia suicide protester Mohammed Bouazizi dies.” BBC News. 5 Jan. 2011. 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12120228 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“UN in Libya.” United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 
 http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5110&language=en-US  
(accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
United Nations. “Article 1.” Charter of the United Nations. 26 Jun. 1945. 
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, (accessed May 2, 2012). 
 
United Nations. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
 Genocide.” (New York, 1948).  
 
United Nations. “Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
 War.” (Geneva, 1949).  
 
United Nations. “Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights.” 
 (Geneva, 1996).  
 
United Nations. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations 
 during  the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 15 Dec. 1999.  
http://daccess- ods.un.org/TMP/4105054.73613739.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).  
 
United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 
 1949). 
 
United Nations General Assembly. “2005 World Summit Outcome.” 15 Sep. 2005. 
 http://daccess-dds-
   128 
 ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 
 (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).   
 
United Nations Press Release. “UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Prevention 
 of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, 
 Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya.” 22 Feb. 2011. 
 http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advi
 sers%2 0Statement%20on%20Libya,%2022%20February%202011.pdf (accessed 
 5 Apr. 2013).  
“United Nations Protection Force: Profile.” United Nations. 31 Aug. 1996. 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm (accessed 1 Apr. 
 2013).  
 
“UNSMIL Mandate.” United Nations Support Mission in Libya. 
 http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3544&language=en-US  
(accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“UNTSO Background.” United Nations. 
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/background.shtml  
(accessed 23 Mar. 2013).   
 
“U.S. says five-nation coalition launching Libya strikes.” Reuters. 19 Mar. 2011.  
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/19/us-obama-libya-
 idUSTRE72I2Z520110319 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013). 
 
“Verbatim—Sarkozy justifie l’intervention militaire en Libye.” Le Point. 19 Mar. 2011. 
 http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/verbatim-sarkozy-justifie-l-intervention-militaire-en-
 libye-19-03-2011-1308723_24.php (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Walzer, Michael. Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations 
 (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
 
Walzer, Michael. “The Case Against our Attack on Libya.” The New Republic. 20 Mar. 
 2011. http://www.tnr.com/article/world/85509/the-case-against-our-attack-
 libya?id=DFpiAHglLRaR7W8vDGJCsnhKIl0ob0KQ24uoF2PXR0nP6QrGDHgi
 XvGf6bgfeaz/  (accessed 20 Feb. 2013). 
 
Walzer, Michael. "The Politics of Rescue." Social Research 62, no. 1 (1995). 
 
“War in Libya: Europe’s confused response,” Strategic Comments 17, no. 4 (2011).  
 
Warner, Daniel. “The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical Engagement.” 
 Millenium Journal of International Studies 32, no.1 (2003). 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. Humanitarian Intervention: War and Conflict in the Modern World 
 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).  
   129 
 
Weiss, Thomas G. “RtoP Alive and Well after Libya,” Ethics & International Affairs 25, 
  no. 3 (2011).  
 
Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease. The 
 United  Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010).  
 
Weiss, Thomas G. and Jarat Chopra. “The UN Should Enforce Peace.” The Christian 
 Science Monitor. 2 Feb. 1993.  
http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0202/02181.html (accessed 23 Mar. 2013). 
 
Wentz, Larry. “Lessons from Bosnia: the IFOR Experience.” Department of Defense 
 Command and Control Research Program.  
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Wentz_Bosnia.pdf (accessed 23 Mar. 2013).    
 
Western, Jon. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and 
 Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security 
 26, no. 4 (2002). 
 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
 Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
Willsher, Kim. “Bernard-Henri Lévy dismisses criticism for leading France to Conflict.” 
 The Guardian. 26 Mar. 2011.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/27/libya-bernard-henri-levy-france 
 (accessed 24 Mar. 2013).  
 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. “Kosovo and the New Imperialism.” Monthly Review 51, no. 2 
 (1999).  
 
Wright, John. Libya: A Modern History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
 1982). 
 
“Yugoslavia: Society.” Library of Congress Country Studies. Dec. 1990. 
 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+yu0006)  
(accessed 23 Mar. 2013).   
 
Zajadlo, Jerzy. “Legality and the Legitimization of Humanitarian Intervention.” 
 American Behavioral Scientist 48, no. 6 (2005).   
 
 
 
 
